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Returning to Hazelwoods Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech 
 
Emily Gold Waldman∗ 
 
         Nearly twenty years ago in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,1 the 
Supreme Court  in upholding the constitutionality of a public high school principals 
censorship of a student newspaper produced in a journalism class  held that educators 
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and 
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.2  Since then, 
Hazelwoods reasonable relat[ion] to legitimate pedagogical concerns standard has 
been invoked in a tremendous array of school speech cases.  Not only has it been 
employed in a wide variety of student speech contexts,3 but courts have also relied upon 
it in cases involving public schools textbook selections and curricular choices,4 teachers 
in-class speech,5 and even the speech of outside entities (such as recruiters and 
advertisers) in the school setting.6   
In the process, two major circuit splits have developed.  First, the circuits have 
divided over how far Hazelwoods reach should extend, particularly in terms of whether 
                                                
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002; B.A., Yale 
University, 1999.  Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert A. Katzmann, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, 2005-2006; Law Clerk to the Honorable William G. Young, United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts, 2002-2003.  I thank Jill Gross, Eloise Pasachoff, and Paul Secunda for 
their helpful comments on this article. 
1 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
2 Id. at 273. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 60-64; 260-91. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 66-98. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 99-157. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 158-73. 
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Hazelwood is applicable to teachers classroom speech.7  Second, a sharp split has 
developed over whether Hazelwood goes so far as to permit viewpoint-based speech 
restrictions, which are generally prohibited under the First Amendment.8  Both of these 
questions have given rise to rich parallel lines of scholarship.9  The two issues, however, 
are rarely considered in tandem. 
                                                
7 Compare Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying 
Hazelwood to teachers in-class speech); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 
719 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 
F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); 
Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); with Mayer v. Monroe 
Cty. Comm. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the approach set forth in Pickering v. Board 
of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), to teachers in-class speech); Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 
1036 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(same); Kirkland v. Northside Independent School Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).   See infra 
text accompanying notes 99-173. 
8 Compare Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 928-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 2002) (same) with 
Peck v. Baldwinsville Central Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-633 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Hazelwood 
prohibits viewpoint discrimination); Planned Parenthood of So. Nevada, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941 
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).  See infra text accompanying notes 174-92. 
9 On the question of what legal standard should apply to teachers classroom speech, see, for example, 
Emily Holmes Davis, Note and Recent Development, Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas: The First 
Amendment and Public School Teachers Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 335 (2005); R. 
Weston Donehower, Note, Boring Lessons: Defining the Limits of a Teachers First Amendment Right to 
Speak Through the Classroom, 102 MICH. L. REV. 517 (2003); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What 
Did You Learn in School Today?  Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational 
Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (2002); Todd A. DeMitchell, Counterpoint: a New Balance of In-Class 
Speech: No Longer Just a Mouthpiece, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 473 (2002); Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: 
Teachers Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2001); Theresa J. Bryant, May 
We Teach Tolerance?  Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 579 (1999); William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the 
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213 (1999) [hereinafter Buss, Academic Freedom]; W. Stuart 
Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 
(1998); Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right 
to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1990).  
 As to the viewpoint discrimination issue, see, for example, Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and 
Viewpiont Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647 (2005); Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, 
Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217 (2004); Katie Hammett, School Shootings, Ceramic Tiles, and Hazelwood: The 
Continuing Lessons of the Columbine Tragedy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 393 (2004); Denise Daugherty, Note & 
Comment, Free Speech in Public Schools: Has the Supreme Court Created a Haven for Viewpoint 
Discrimination in School-Sponsored Speech, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (2004); Samuel P. Jordan, 
Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened 
Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555 (2003); Janna J. Annest, Note & Comment, Only the News Thats Fit 
to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public 
School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227 (2002); William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public 
Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505 (1989) [hereinafter Buss, School Newspapers]. 
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This article argues that these two issues are related in a critical, yet largely 
unexamined, way: the extension of Hazelwood into contexts beyond the student speech 
realm has severely muddled the question of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based 
speech restrictions.  Indeed, out of the five circuits that have explicitly reached the 
question of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, three did so in cases 
that did not even involve student speech.  Moreover, the varying speech contexts in which 
the circuits have first confronted this question have led to divergent results.  The First 
Circuit, for instance, first addressed the viewpoint discrimination issue in a case where it 
applied Hazelwood to teacher speech; it concluded that Hazelwood generally permitted 
viewpoint discrimination.  On the other hand, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits both first 
reached the question in cases where they applied Hazelwood to the speech of outside 
entities (respectively, yearbook advertisers and recruiters at a career fair), and they both 
concluded that Hazelwood generally forbade viewpoint discrimination.  This is not a 
coincidence.  Rather, the significantly different interests implicated by teacher speech and 
outside entity speech directly contributed to these conflicting interpretations of 
Hazelwood.  In short, Hazelwood has been pulled in so many directions that its 
underlying standard has lost coherence.   
In this article, I suggest that this conundrum can be untangled by returning to 
Hazelwoods core as a student speech case.  I first argue that Hazelwoods reach has been 
significantly over-extended, and that it should be applied only in student speech cases.  
Not only did Hazelwood arise in the student speech context, but its rationale and 
approach are in fact uniquely suited to that context.   
 4
Removing these other categories of speech from the Hazelwood equation, in turn, 
helps shed light on the persistent debate over whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-
based discrimination in addition to content-based discrimination.  In other words, 
resolution of the circuit split over Hazelwoods reach helps to resolve the circuit split 
over whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-related speech restrictions.  Once we return 
to Hazelwoods origins as a student speech case, and to the text of Hazelwood itself, I 
argue that it becomes relatively clear that Hazelwood contemplated the permissibility of 
viewpoint-based restrictions on student speech in certain circumstances.  The real issue is 
not whether viewpoint discrimination is permitted by Hazelwood, but when.    
Answering this question, in turn, requires a more nuanced analysis of (1) what it 
means for student speech to occur in a school-sponsored context, such that, as the 
Hazelwood Court put it, students, parents, and other members of the public might 
reasonably perceive [the speech] to bear the imprimatur of the school10; and (2) which 
types of restrictions on student speech are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.  I argue that the courts should adopt a sliding-scale approach in which the 
level of school sponsorship is weighed against the nature of and justification for the 
speech restriction.  Where the perception of school sponsorship is at its highest  because 
the student speech at issue will affect the substance of other students classroom learning 
experience or permanently transform the physical appearance of the school  then a 
school should receive broad latitude to restrict the speech, even if its restrictions reflect 
viewpoint-based discrimination.  By contrast, where the perception of school imprimatur 
is lower  because the student speech, despite its occurrence in a school-sponsored 
context, is clearly attributable to a particular student and will transform neither other 
                                                
10 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
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students in-class experience nor the permanent appearance of the school  then any 
viewpoint-based restrictions imposed by the school should be subjected to more rigorous 
examination.   
 This article proceeds in five parts.  First, I discuss the Hazelwood decision in 
depth.  Next, I discuss the various contexts in which Hazelwood has been applied, and the 
circuit split that has developed over how broadly it should reach.11  Third, I describe the 
circuit split that has developed over whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based speech 
restrictions, highlighting the disparate speech contexts in which the circuits have reached 
their divergent conclusions.  Fourth, I argue that the two splits are linked by a connective 
thread: the over-extension of Hazelwood.  I discuss why Hazelwood is uniquely suited to 
the student speech context, and why other doctrines  namely, the Pickering-Connick12 
public employee analysis for teachers classroom speech and basic public forum analysis 
for outside entities speech  provide better frameworks for analyzing school speech 
restrictions as to non-students, and I draw on the Supreme Courts very recent decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos13 to support this view.   Finally, having returned to Hazelwoods 
                                                
11 My discussion, and indeed this entire article, is focused on K-12 public schools, the context in which 
Hazelwood itself arose.  The Seventh Circuit, in an en banc opinion, recently held that Hazelwood is also 
generally applicable in the university setting, over the objections of a strong dissent.  See Hosty v. Carter, 
412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  Several other circuits have also pointed in this direction by 
invoking Hazelwood in cases involving speech restrictions at the university level.  See, e.g., Bishop v. 
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District, 208 F.3d 908 
(10th Cir. 2000).  Not surprisingly, the question of whether Hazelwood should apply to the university 
setting, or should instead be limited to the K-12 public school context in which it arose, has given rise to 
much scholarship, particularly in Hostys aftermath.  See, e.g., Edward L. Carter, Kevin R. Kemper, and 
Barbara L. Morgenstern, Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157 (2006); Jessica Lyons, Note, Defining Freedom of 
the College Press After Hosty v. Carter, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1771 (2006).  Although I draw upon some of the 
university cases insofar as they relate to my own discussion of whether Hazelwood should apply to 
teachers classroom speech, the separate question of Hazelwoods applicability in the university setting as 
opposed to the K-12 setting is beyond the scope of this article.   
12 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).   
13 126 S. Ct. 1951. 
 6
core as a doctrine governing student speech, I set forth my proposal for a sliding-scale 
framework within which restrictions on student speech can be evaluated. 
I.  The Hazelwood Decision 
The Hazelwood dispute began when the principal of Hazelwood East High  
School  located in St. Louis County, Missouri  received copies of the page proofs for 
the upcoming May 13, 1983 issue of the Spectrum, Hazelwood East High Schools 
newspaper.14  The Spectrum was written and edited by the students in the high schools 
Journalism II class, and was largely funded by the districts Board of Education.15  A 
faculty member served as the journalism teacher and newspaper adviser, and typically 
provided the principal with copies of the page proofs for review prior to each issues 
publication.16   
 When Hazelwood Easts principal saw the copies of the May 13 page proofs, he 
was troubled by two of the articles.  One article discussed three pregnant students at the 
high school, and the principal was concerned that the references to sexual activity and 
birth control were inappropriate for some of the schools younger students and that the 
students might be identifiable from the text, even though pseudonyms had been used.17  
The other article discussed the impact of divorce on some students at the school; here, the 
principal was concerned that the article included a students complaints about her father 
without having provided her parents with an opportunity to respond to these comments or 
to consent to their publication.18  Believing that there was no time to make changes to 
these stories, the principal ordered the faculty adviser to pull the pages from the issue on 
                                                
14 Id. at 263. 
15 Id. at 262-63. 
16 Id. at 263. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 263-64. 
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which these two articles appeared.19  The adviser complied, and the issue was released 
without the two pages in question.20  Three students on the Spectrum staff then filed suit, 
alleging that the censorship of these articles had violated their First Amendment rights.21   
 At the time the Hazelwood East students filed their lawsuit, there was a single 
Supreme Court decision addressing school restrictions on student speech: Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.22  There, the Supreme Court had upheld 
the right of students to wear black armbands to school in protesting the Vietnam War.23  
Stating that [i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,24 the 
Court concluded that the students had a constitutional right to wear their armbands 
(which the Court deemed pure speech25) unless doing so would materially and 
substantially disrupt the work of the school or invade the rights of others.26  Thus, 
because the armbands, while causing discussion outside of the classrooms, had not 
disrupted classroom work nor intruded upon the lives of others, they had to be allowed.27   
 Applying Tinker to the Hazelwood dispute, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
high school principals censorship of two pages in the Spectrum had been 
unconstitutional, reversing the district courts ruling that the censorship was justified.28  
The court held that the Spectrum had functioned as a public forum for student viewpoints, 
and that there was no reasonable basis upon which the principal could have forecast that 
                                                
19 Id. at 264. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
23 Id. at 514. 
24 Id. at 506. 
25 Id. at 508. 
26 Id. at 513. 
27 Id. at 514. 
28 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374-76 (8th Cir. 1986).  Id. at 1374.  
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the publication of the articles would have materially disrupted classwork or given rise to 
substantial disorder in the school.29  Nor would the articles publication have met the 
alternative justification recognized by Tinker: the invasion of the rights of other students, 
which the Eighth Circuit narrowly construed as referring only to situations in which 
publication of th[e] speech could result in tort liability for the school.30  Accordingly, 
the court ruled in the Hazelwood students favor on their First Amendment claim, 
prompting the school district to file a petition for certiorari, which was granted. 
 By the time Hazelwood reached the Supreme Court a year later, the Supreme 
Court had issued a second decision involving students First Amendment rights: Bethel 
School District No. 403  v. Fraser.31  In Fraser, a high school student had been 
disciplined for the speech that he delivered at a school assembly, in which he nominated a 
fellow student for a student elective office.32  His speech used an elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor: he stated the candidate was firm in his pantsa man who 
takes his point and pounds it in . . . who will go to the very end  even the climax, for 
each and every one of you.33  After the school punished him for giving the speech, the 
student filed suit, alleging a First Amendment violation.34  Although the Ninth Circuit 
applied Tinker and affirmed the lower courts ruling in the students favor, the Supreme 
Court reversed.35  Rather than applying Tinkers material disruption/invasion of rights 
test, the Fraser Court essentially deemed Tinker inapplicable, emphasizing the marked 
distinction between the political message of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual 
                                                
29 Id. at 1375. 
30 Id. at 1376. 
31 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
32 Id. at 677. 
33 Id. at 678; id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 670. 
35 Id. at 679-80. 
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content of respondents speech in this case.36  Emphasizing that the penalties imposed 
in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint, the Court concluded that the First 
Amendment did not prevent school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar 
and lewd speech such as respondents would undermine the schools basic educational 
mission.37  It thus rejected the students First Amendment argument and ruled in the 
school districts favor.38 
 Hazelwood presented yet a third factual variation.  Unlike Fraser, the speech at 
issue was not lewd or vulgar.  And unlike Tinker, the speech was not simply the personal 
expression of individual students; it was instead being communicated through a school-
sponsored activity: a newspaper produced by a journalism class.  Pulling together strands 
of Tinker and Fraser, the Hazelwood Court began by noting that although public school 
students did not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate, the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools were 
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.39  The 
Hazelwood Court went on  in section II.A of its analysis40  to conclude, through 
application of general public forum doctrine, that the Spectrum was not a forum for 
public expression by students.41  Rather, it was part of the educational curriculum and a 
regular classroom activity.42  This, in turn, led the Court to conclude that school 
                                                
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 685. 
38 Id. at 687. 
39 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266. 
40 I note the headings that the Hazelwood Court used to structure its opinion because, as discussed infra, I 
believe that they help clarify the scope of the Courts holding.  See infra text accompanying notes 219-221. 
41 Id. at 267-270.   
42 Id. at 268. 
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officials were entitled to regulate the contents of the Spectrum in any reasonable 
manner.43   
 What, then, qualified as a reasonable manner of regulation?  In section II.B, the 
Hazelwood Court left general public forum doctrine behind to address this issue.  First, 
the Court again emphasized the distinction between whether the First Amendment 
requires a school to tolerate particular student speech (the Tinker question) and whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote student speech (the 
Hazelwood question).44   The Court explained: 
The former question addresses educators ability to silence a students personal 
expression that happens to occur on the school premises.  The latter question 
concerns educators authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.  These 
activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or 
not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by 
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student 
participants and audiences.45 
 
As to this latter category of speech, the Court concluded that educators could impose 
restrictions as long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.46  Such concerns included, for instance, (1) ensuring that participants learn 
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach; (2) shielding readers and listeners 
from material that might be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and (3) generally 
                                                
43 Id. at 270.  As discussed further below, the Supreme Court explained that public schools are not 
traditional public forums (such as streets, parks, and the like), and can be deemed public forums only if 
school authorities have by policy or practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general 
public . . . or by some segment of the public such as student organizations.  If the facilities have instead 
been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been 
created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and 
other members of the school community.  Id. at 267 (citing Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local 
Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).   
44 Id. at 270-71. 
45 Id. at 271. 
46 Id. at 273. 
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disassociating the school from any speech that (a) was ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased, or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, (b) could be seen as 
advocat[ing] drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent 
with the shared values of a civilized social order, or (c) could associate the school with 
any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.47   
In justifying this approach, the Hazelwood Court highlighted the negative 
consequences that it envisioned were schools not granted this level of discretion over 
school-sponsored student speech.  First, the schools would be constrained from their role 
as a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.48  
Second, in direct response to the dissents suggestion that Tinker uniformly provided the 
appropriate test for school restrictions on student speech,49 the Court argued that this 
would require schools to open their newspapers to all student expression that does not 
threaten material disruption of classwork or violation of rights that are protected by 
law, regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or personally insulting that 
expression otherwise might be.50  Schools would likely prefer to shut student 
newspapers down altogether, the Court predicted, rather than permitting such views to be 
circulated under their auspices.51 
Pursuant to its newly-articulated reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical 
concern test, the Hazelwood Court proceeded to rule in favor of the school district.52  As 
                                                
47 Id. at 271-72. 
48 Id. at 272. 
49 Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 276 & n.9. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 274-76. 
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to the teen pregnancy article, the Court held that the principals censorship was 
reasonably related to shielding 14-year-old freshmen and perhaps their even younger 
brothers and sisters, who might read the paper if it were brought home, from the articles 
frank discussion of the teenage girls sexual histories and use or non-use of birth 
control.53  Additionally, the Court stated that the principal might reasonably have been 
concerned that the article had failed to adequately protect the teenage girls anonymity or 
to provide their boyfriends and parents (who were mentioned in the article) the chance to 
offer a response or consent to the publication.54  Similarly, as to the divorce article, the 
Court found that the principal could reasonably have concluded that the students father 
was entitled to an opportunity to defend himself as a matter of journalistic fairness.55  
The Court thus concluded that the principal could reasonably have concluded that these 
articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the Journalism II curriculum that 
pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks.56  This, in turn, 
made the principals censorship of the articles reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns, and therefore constitutional.57   
                                                    
II.   Hazelwoods Broad Reach 
Hazelwood immediately changed the landscape for assessing the constitutionality 
of school restrictions on student speech.  Taken together, Tinker and Hazelwood 
essentially divided the student speech universe in two: student speech that merely 
occurred on school premises could only be restricted if it caused a material disruption or 
                                                
53 Id. at 274-75. 
54 Id. at 274. 
55 Id. at 275. 
56 Id. at 276. 
57 Id.  
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invaded others rights; while student speech disseminated through a school-sponsored 
context could be restricted as long as the school had a legitimate pedagogical reason for 
doing so.58  Hazelwood itself made clear that this latter category should be construed 
broadly, encompassing not only classroom activities and official school-sponsored 
publications and productions, but also any other expressive activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school, provided that they are supervised by faculty members and designed to teach 
particular knowledge or skills to students.59   
And, indeed, over the past nineteen years, Hazelwood has been invoked in a 
tremendous array of student speech cases, in almost every conceivable context from the 
kindergarten to the high school level.  Examples, each of which I return to in Section V, 
include: 
• A kindergartner who sued when, after he created a poster for a school 
assignment to illustrate ways of saving the environment, his school displayed 
his poster in a way that concealed its depiction of  Jesus Christ;60 
 
• An elementary school student who sued when his school refused to allow him 
to distribute candy canes with religious messages during a classroom holiday 
party;61 
 
• A high school student who sued when his school disqualified his candidacy 
for student council presidency after he delivered a speech at a school assembly 
                                                
58 Fraser, in turn, can be viewed as applying to the sub-category of cases in which the speech at issue is so 
vulgar and offensive, and so lacking in political content, that no constitutional protection attaches when it is 
uttered in the school setting.  Of course, had Fraser been decided after Hazelwood, perhaps the Supreme 
Court would have simply applied Hazelwood  (given that the speech was delivered at a school-sponsored 
assembly) and upheld the restriction as reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose.  Indeed, the 
Fraser Court gestured toward the importance of school sponsorship in stating that [a] high school 
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue.  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.  The 
Fraser Court did not, however, rest its holding on the fact of school sponsorship, a concept that did not 
come fully into focus until Hazelwood.   
59 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
60 Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District, 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the schools 
actions did not satisfy Hazelwood).  See infra text accompanying notes 184-85; 285-89. 
61 Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (holding that the schools actions satisfied 
Hazelwood) (3d Cir. 2003).  See infra text accompanying notes 274-78. 
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in which he stated, among other things, that [t]he administration plays tricks 
with your mind and they hope you wont notice.  For example, why does [the 
assistant principal] stutter when he is on the intercom?  He doesnt have a 
speech impediment.  If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for 
me for president.62 
 
• Several Columbine High School students and their parents, who sued when 
the school refused to hang the tiles that they had created as part of a tile-
painting project to commemorate the April 1999 massacre carried out by two 
Columbine students;63 and  
 
• A high-school student who sued after her school removed the religious murals 
that she had painted on school walls as part of a high school beautification 
project.64  
 
As disparate as these cases are, they all share a common thread: they involve 
restrictions on student speech in various school-sponsored contexts.  It makes perfect 
sense, then, that Hazelwood was employed to assess each of these disputes. 
More surprising, however, is that numerous courts have also been applying 
Hazelwood in cases that do not involve student speech.   Indeed, in 1992  a mere four 
years after Hazelwood was decided  Rosemary Salomone described this trend, writing 
that  just about any aspect of school sponsored activity (newspapers, career days, 
elective courses) conducted anywhere in the school (classrooms, hallways) is considered 
to be a nonpublic forum subject to the reasonableness standard of Hazelwood.65  This 
phenomenon has only increased since then, with numerous courts apparently concluding 
that all speech that can be considered school sponsored  regardless of whether it is 
student speech, teacher classroom speech, outside entity speech, or speech that reflects 
                                                
62 Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the schools actions satisfied Hazelwood). 
See infra text accompanying notes 290-92. 
63 Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that schools actions 
satisfied Hazelwood).  See infra text accompanying notes 189-91; 279-83. 
64 Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the schools 
actions satisfied Hazelwood).  See infra text accompanying notes 203-16; 279-83. 
65 Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 
253, 316 (1992). 
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district-level decisions about textbooks and curricula  falls under Hazelwoods umbrella.  
Below, in order to set the stage for my argument, I discuss the various non-student-
speech contexts in which Hazelwood has been applied, and the circuit splits that have 
developed in each of these areas. 
A. Textbook/Curriculum Section 
The courts are generally conflicted about whether Hazelwoods reasonable 
relat[ion] to a legitimate pedagogical purpose standard applies to school districts 
decisions about textbooks and curricula, sometimes even issuing mixed messages within 
a single opinion.  Those courts that have concluded that Hazelwood is inapplicable here 
have done so on the explicit grounds that textbook and curricular decisions simply reflect 
pure government speech, and thus cannot violate the speech rights of others.  By contrast, 
the courts that have applied Hazelwood here seem to have implicitly interpreted 
Hazelwood as announcing a generally applicable reasonableness standard for all school 
district decisions about speech-related matters.  Although the splits over textbooks and 
curricula have not yet entirely risen to the surface, an examination of the decisions on this 
topic makes clear that divisions are percolating.   
As to textbook selection, only two circuits have reached the issue of whether 
Hazelwood applies, and they have reached opposite conclusions.  The Fifth Circuit  
recently confronted this question in Chiras v. Miller,66 in which a textbook author and 
high school student brought First Amendment claims after the Texas State Board of 
Education refused to approve the textbook authors environmental science textbook.67  
The plaintiffs argued that this refusal, which they alleged to have stemmed from the 
                                                
66 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005). 
67 Id. at 607-608. 
 16
influence of conservative think tanks, violated Hazelwood.68  The Fifth Circuit, noting 
that there is no strong consensus among the circuit courts regarding the application of 
First Amendment principles to the selection of curricular materials by school boards, 
engaged in a detailed analysis of whether Hazelwood was applicable here.69  It held that it 
was not, stating that when the Board of Education devises the curriculum for Texas and 
selects the textbook with which teachers will teach [] the students, it is the state 
speaking.70  This rendered Hazelwood inapplicable, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, because a 
necessary precondition of Hazelwood was that some sort of forum for the expression of 
others had been created in the first place.71   
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged, however, that this conclusion conflicted with 
that reached by the Eleventh Circuit in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County.72  
There, when parents filed suit after the school board removed a previously approved 
textbook from an elective high school course due to complaints from other parents that 
the book contained sexually explicit material (namely, passages from Lysistrata and The 
Millers Tale), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Hazelwood provided direct 
guidance.73  It broadly characterized Hazelwood as establish[ing] a relatively lenient 
test for regulation of expression which may fairly be characterized as part of the school 
curriculum, and did not discuss Hazelwoods specific genesis in the student speech 
context.74  In applying Hazelwood, the Virgil court ultimately concluded that the Boards 
action was constitutional, stating that the textbook decision was a curricular decision that 
                                                
68 Id. at 609-611. 
69 Id. at 614-16. 
70 Id. at 614. 
71  Id. at 617. 
72 Id. (citing Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cty., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)).   
73 Virgil, 862. F.2d at 1521. 
74 Id.  
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would be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school, and that it had been 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns  namely,  the explicit sexuality 
and excessively vulgar language in the selections.75  Thus, although both the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits reached the same ultimate results  upholding the constitutionality of 
the school districts actions  they took divergent routes in getting there. 
The case law surrounding Hazelwoods applicability to curriculum selection is 
murkier.  The Third Circuit has essentially staked out the position that Hazelwoods 
reasonableness standard does not apply to curricular decisions.  It adopted this view in 
one of the first post-Hazelwood cases to raise this issue: Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of 
Education.76  There, a high school teacher brought a First Amendment claim after her 
school prohibited her from organizing her classroom according to the Learnball 
technique, which involved dividing the class into teams, giving students the opportunity 
to elect their team leaders and establish class rules, and setting up a system of rewards 
including radio playing in the classroom.77  [W]e do not have to delineate the scope of 
academic freedom afforded to teachers under the First Amendment here, the Third 
Circuit ruled, because no court has found that teachers First Amendment rights extend 
to choosing their own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention 
of school policy or dictates.78  In 1998, the Third Circuit reaffirmed this view in 
Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania,79 holding  in an opinion authored by 
then-Judge Alito  that Hazelwood did not apply to school administrators decisions 
                                                
75 Id. at 1522-23.  The Virgil Court explained that it was not applying the Supreme Courts 1982 decision in 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), which had related to the removal of books from a school 
library, and which, as the Virgil court noted, had taken special note of the unique role of the school 
library as a repository for voluntary inquiry.  Id. at 1524 & n.8 (citing Pico, 457 U.S. at 869). 
76 910 F.2d 1172 (1990). 
77 Id. at 1174-75. 
78 Id. at 1176. 
79 156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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about what will be taught in the classroom, and that it therefore did not need to engage 
in the Hazelwood analysis.80   
Subsequent to the Bradley Courts 1990 pronouncement that no court had 
recognized teachers First Amendment rights to choose their own curriculum, some 
courts did begin to move in that direction.  In particular, the Tenth Circuit suggested in 
Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District81 that it disagreed with the argument 
that a teacher enjoys no First Amendment right to determine the educational content of a 
course, noting the Supreme Courts statement in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (a case 
involving a challenge brought by public university professors to a state law requiring 
them to certify that they were not Communists) that academic freedom is a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.82   The Vanderhurst Court went on to state that, at least 
for purposes of the instant case, it viewed Hazelwood as providing the appropriate 
standard for assessing whether the termination of an instructor who had attempt[ed] to 
communicate course content at odds with the chosen curriculum was constitutional.83   
Other courts have issued mixed messages as to whether Hazelwood applies to 
curricular choices, suggesting both that curricular choices reflect pure government speech 
and that Hazelwood is still somehow applicable.  In Bishop v. Aronov,84 for example, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated both that Hazelwood was applicable to a case involving a schools 
                                                
80 Id. at 491.  Edwards arose in the public university context, and thus presumably would apply with equal 
(if not greater) force in the K-12 setting. 
81 208 F.3d 908 (10th Cir. 2000). 
82 Id. at 913 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597 (1967)).   
83Id. at 913-914.  The court  noted that both sides had embrace[d] the [Hazelwood] approach as the proper 
means to analyze Vanderhursts First Amendment claim.  Id. at 914-15. 
84 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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restrictions on the content of a particular course,85 and that when a teacher and school 
disagree about the content of a course, the school must have the final say, because 
schools must have command of their own courses.86  Similarly, a recent Northern 
District of California decision first stated that teachers do not have a first amendment 
right to determine what curriculum will be taught in the classroom,87 but then also stated 
that the plaintiff teacher (who had sued over restrictions placed on his use of 
supplemental classroom materials that had religious content) might still state a claim if 
he alleges restrictions which are not reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.88  
The most recent development on this front comes from the Seventh Circuit, which 
had initially straddled the line as to whether Hazelwood applied to curricular choices, but 
implicitly retreated from this position in January 2007.  In Webster v. New Lenox School 
District,89 a 1990 case in which a teacher alleged that his First Amendment rights had 
been violated when the school district prohibited him from teaching creationism in the 
classroom,90 the Seventh Circuit issued an ambiguous decision.  It first stated that the 
school board had the authority to set the curriculum,91 and that the first amendment is 
not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular 
content.92   But it then proceeded to apply Hazelwood, stating that that the school 
districts prohibition on the teaching of creationism had been related to the school boards 
important and legitimate pedagogical interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause 
                                                
85 Id. at 1074. 
86 Id. at 1076. 
87 Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
88 Id. at 1273. 
89 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990). 
90 Id. at 1006. 
91 Id. at 1007. 
92 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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violation.93  The Seventh Circuit thus left unclear whether it had invoked Hazelwood at 
the end of its decision essentially to gild the lily, or whether it genuinely believed that the 
school district needed to satisfy the Hazelwood standard in order to prevail against the 
teachers claim.  In the 2007 case of Mayer v. Monroe County Community School 
Corporation94  which involved the related issue of constitutional protection for teachers 
classroom speech  the Seventh Circuit essentially answered that question.  
Characterizing Webster as simply having held that the teacher did not have a 
constitutional right to introduce his own views on the subject but must stick to the 
prescribed curriculum  not only the prescribed subject matter, but the prescribed 
perspective on that subject matter, the Mayer court did not even acknowledge Websters 
previous invocation of Hazelwood.95   Mayer thus suggests that to the extent the Seventh 
Circuit previously deemed Hazelwood applicable to curricular choices, it no longer does 
so.96 
Given the evolving and sometimes amorphous nature of circuit decisions on this 
issue,  it is hard to draw firm classifications as to which circuits view Hazelwood as fully 
applicable to curricular selections.  Much of the murkiness, I believe, stems from the fact 
that the curricular selection question often blends into the question of when schools can 
constitutionally restrict teachers in-school speech.  While the Third Circuit in Bradley 
gestured toward distinguishing between these two issues,97 the Seventh, Tenth, and 
                                                
93 Id. at 1008. 
94 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
95 Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Comm. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).  For further discussion of 
this opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 140-41; 242-45. 
96 As I argue infra, this development accords with the Supreme Courts recent holding in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).   See infra text accompanying notes 239-45. 
97 Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.3d 1172, 1176 (suggesting that even if teacher possess some 
academic freedom under the First Amendment, no court has found that teachers First Amendment rights 
extend to choosing their own curriculum). 
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Eleventh Circuits have drawn no such distinction.98  As such, turning to an assessment of 
the circuit split over whether Hazelwood applies to teachers in-school speech helps to 
shed light on the incipient split over curriculum selection. 
B. Teachers Classroom Speech 
 The division among the circuits as to Hazelwoods reach is starker when it comes 
to public school teachers in-class speech, but it continues to evolve.  Since Hazelwood 
was decided, the First, Second, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly 
applied it to restrictions on teachers in-school speech (regardless of whether that speech 
related to curricular decisions or consisted of stray classroom comments), while the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have instead chosen to apply the approach set forth in 
Pickering v. Board of Education99 and its progeny for assessing the constitutionality of 
speech restrictions on public employees.  Most recently, as noted above and discussed 
further below, the Seventh Circuit, having previously applied Hazelwood to teachers 
classroom speech, suddenly switched gears and applied Pickering instead.  Meanwhile, 
the Third and Ninth Circuits have not definitively weighed in (although there are clues as 
to their inclinations) on the issue, and the D.C. Circuit has not reached it. 
                                                
98 For example, the Vanderhurst court, when suggesting that Hazelwood should apply to the plaintiff 
teachers choices about what substantive curricular content to cover in his class, directly invoked a line of 
cases holding that Hazelwood applies to teachers classroom comments.  Vanderhurst, 208 F.3d at 914.  In 
particular, the Vanderhurst court focused on the Tenth Circuits previous decision in Miles v. Denver 
Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991), which, as discussed infra, had held Hazelwood applicable in 
a case involving a teachers offhand classroom comment about two particular students (and did not present 
any issues relating to curricular selections).   Id.  Similarly, the Aronov court viewed the curriculum content 
issue as ultimately reducing to the question of to what degree a school may control classroom instruction 
before touching the First Amendment rights of a teacher, thus drawing no distinction between curricular 
issues and classroom speech issues.  Aronov, 926 F.2d at 1073.  By the same token, even though Mayer 
involved not a teachers curricular selection but rather an isolated classroom comment about the teachers 
personal opposition to the war in Iraq, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless fell back on the principle that a 
teacher must teach whatever curriculum the board describes.     
99 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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 The initial circuit to apply Hazelwood to teachers in-school speech was the 
Seventh Circuit in its 1990 Webster decision, which  as noted above  briefly referred to 
Hazelwood at the very end of its opinion about school restrictions on the teaching of 
creationism.100  The Eleventh Circuit similarly invoked Hazelwood the following year in 
Aronov, in which it acknowledged that Hazelwood had addressed restrictions on student 
speech rather than teacher speech, but stated that insofar as [Hazelwood] covers the 
extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which suggest the schools 
approval, we adopt the Courts reasoning as suitable to our ends.101   
Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit followed suit in Miles v. Denver Public 
Schools.102  There, a public high school teacher sued after being disciplined for 
commenting to his ninth grade government class that I dont think in 1967 you would 
have seen two students making out on the tennis court.103  This comment  a reference 
to a widely-circulated rumor that two students had been seen having sex on the tennis 
court the previous day  prompted complaints from the parents of the two students in 
question.104  In assessing the teachers claim that the resultant discipline had violated his 
First Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit deemed Hazelwood applicable.105  It 
acknowledged that Hazelwood had involved student speech rather than teacher speech, 
but stated that we find no reason to distinguish between the classroom discussion of 
students and teachers in applying Hazelwood here.  A schools interests in regulating 
classroom speech . . .  are implicated regardless of whether that speech comes from a 
                                                
100 Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990). 
101 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991). 
102 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991). 
103 Id. at 774. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 775. 
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teacher or student.106  The court further found that Hazelwood was satisfied here, 
because the impetus for the discipline had been reasonably related to the schools 
pedagogical interests.107   
 In subsequent years, several circuits joined the trend of applying Hazelwood to 
teacher speech.  In 1993, expressly relying on Miles, the First Circuit concluded in Ward 
v. Hickey108 that Hazelwood should apply where a nontenured teacher sued her school 
district when it chose not to reappoint her because of a discussion that she had engaged in 
with her ninth grade biology class about the abortion of fetuses with Downs 
Syndrome.109  Citing Miles, the First Circuit reasoned that a teachers statements in class 
during an instructional period are . . . part of a curriculum and a regular class activity.  
Like [Hazelwoods] school newspaper, the classroom is not a public forum, and therefore 
is subject to reasonable speech regulation.110  The Second Circuit followed suit in 
1994,111 as did the Eighth Circuit in 1998.112   
By contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have explicitly held that 
the 1967 Pickering decision  which first set out the framework for assessing the 
constitutionality of speech restrictions on public employees  applies with full force to 
restrictions on teachers in-school speech.  Pickering, interestingly enough, itself 
                                                
106 Id. at 777.  The court also stated that [w]e are convinced that if students expression in a school 
newspaper bears the imprimatur of the school, then a teachers expression in the traditional classroom 
setting also bears the imprimatur of the school.  Id. at 776. 
107 Id. at 778-79. 
108 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993). 
109 Id. at 450-453. 
110 Id. at  453.  Ward ended up being decided on rather unusual grounds.  Evidently, the teacher did not 
even try to argue on appeal that the school was not entitled to limit her statements.  Id. at 454.   Instead, 
she argued only that the school had failed to notify her that her conduct was prohibited.  Id.  The First 
Circuit agreed that she had possessed a First Amendment right to know what conduct is proscribed and 
that the school was not entitled to retaliate against speech that it never prohibited, id. at 453-54  a 
holding that not many other courts have reached.  It concluded, however, that she had waived the issue by 
failing to sufficiently raise it below.  Id. at 455. 
111 Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1994). 
112 Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School District R-2, 147 F.3d 718,724 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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involved the speech of a public school teacher, although not in the classroom: the 
plaintiff was a public school teacher dismissed after sending a letter to a local newspaper 
that criticized the school boards funding decisions.113  The Pickering Court held that this 
termination had violated the teachers First Amendment rights, explaining that a balance 
must be struck between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of public services it performs through its employees.114  It concluded that the 
teacher had spoken as a member of the general public about an issue of public concern, 
that the school district could not show that the teachers letter had caused any disruption, 
and that his speech had therefore been constitutionally protected.115  The Court further 
refined this approach in Connick v. Myers,116 developing a two-pronged test for assessing 
the free speech claims of public employees.   The initial threshold question, the Court 
explained, is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern; if not, then the First Amendment claim fails at that juncture.117  If so, then the 
court must proceed to an evaluation of whether the employees First Amendment interest 
in making the speech in question outweighed the employers justification for limiting it, 
an assessment commonly referred to as Pickering balancing.118  In 2006, the Supreme 
                                                
113 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-66. 
114 Id. at 568. 
115 Id. at 572-74. 
116 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
117 Id. at 147 (stating that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, 
but instead as an employee upon matters of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a 
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a 
public agency allegedly in reaction to the employees behavior). 
118 Id. at 148-154 (explaining that when the public employee has spoken as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, the question becomes whether the government was justified in disciplining the employee, which 
requires the court to engage in a particularized balancing that considers the governments interest in the 
effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public as well as the extent to which the 
speech involved matters of public concern).   
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Court further refined this approach in Garcetti v. Ceballos,119 emphasizing that the initial 
threshold inquiry primarily rests on whether the employee was speaking in his capacity as 
a citizen, rather than on whether the speech related to a matter of public concern.120 
The Fifth Circuit was the first to adopt the view that the Pickering-Connick 
framework applied to restrictions on teachers in-class speech, holding in 1989 in 
Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District121 that this framework applied to a 
teachers claim that he had been dismissed for using an unapproved reading list.122  The 
Kirkland court further concluded that the teachers use of his own unapproved reading 
list did not raise a matter of public concern, particularly given that he had never spoken 
out in public about it or attempted to obtain approval for it.123  The court thus concluded 
that his claim could not pass the initial threshold for First Amendment protection, and did 
not proceed to a balancing inquiry.124  Although the court mentioned Hazelwood in 
passing, it did not substantively evaluate whether Hazelwood, as opposed to Pickering, 
provided the applicable framework for the teachers claim.125  As of 1989, of course, 
none of the above cases applying Hazelwood to teachers in-class speech had yet been 
decided. 
 By the time the Fourth Circuit was confronted with the issue in the late 1990s, 
however, the above cases choosing to apply Hazelwood rather than Pickering had indeed 
been decided.  Thus, the Fourth Circuit was presented with a clear choice between 
Hazelwood and Pickering  a choice that ultimately prompted the circuit to go en banc.  
                                                
119 126 S. Ct. 1951. 
120 For further discussion of the Garcetti case, see infra text accompanying notes 239-245.  
121 Kirkland v. Northside Independent School Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989). 
122 Id. at 795-800. 
123 Id. at 800. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
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In the case at issue, Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,126 a high school 
drama teacher sued when she was transferred after having the students in her advanced 
acting class perform a play called Independence in a state competition.127  The play 
depicted the dynamics within a dysfunctional, single-parent family  a divorced mother 
and three daughters; one a lesbian, another pregnant with an illegitimate child.128  After 
the district court dismissed her claim, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reinstated 
it, concluding that Hazelwood provided the best means of navigating her claim.129  The 
court acknowledged that Hazelwood directly addressed the free speech rights of 
students, not teachers, but stated that the rationale that largely animated Hazelwood . .  . 
appears to apply equally well in the context of a teachers play selection for a school-
sponsored drama production.130  The court concluded that although legitimate 
pedagogical reasons might have motivated the school districts decision to discipline the 
teacher for her speech, none had yet been established on the record.131   
The Fourth Circuit subsequently heard the case en banc, and in a 7-6 split, ruled 
that Pickering should instead apply to teachers classroom speech.132  In explaining its 
decision to apply the Pickering-Connick framework, the majority reasoned that [t]his is 
not a case concerning pupil speech, as in Hazelwood, either classroom or otherwise.  The 
case concerns itself exclusively with employee speech, as does Connick.133  The 
majority further concluded that teachers lacked a First Amendment right to participate in 
the makeup of the curriculum of a public high school, reasoning that  
                                                
126 98 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1996), revd, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
127 98 F.3d at 1476-77. 
128 Id. at 1476. 
129 Id. at 1482. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 1479. 
132 Boring, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
133 Id. at 371 n. 2. 
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Someone must fix the curriculum of any school, public or private.  In the case of a 
 public school, in our opinion, it is far better public policy, absent a valid statutory 
 directive on the subject, that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the 
 local school authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to the 
 teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges.134     
                         
By contrast, the dissent (written by the author of the initial majority opinion) continued to 
argue that Hazelwood should apply, asserting that the Pickering-Connick framework did 
not provide a workable formula for analyzing whether the First Amendment protects a 
teachers in class speech . . . . Her speech is neither ordinary employee workplace speech 
nor common public debate.135     
 In 2001, the Sixth Circuit threw in its lot with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, 
concluding that Pickering should apply to teachers in-class speech.  In the case at issue, 
Cockrel v. Shelby County School District,136 the plaintiff teacher was terminated after, 
among other things, inviting celebrity Woody Harrelson to come talk to her fifth grade 
class about the environmental benefits of industrial hemp.137  The Sixth Circuit applied 
Pickering to her First Amendment claim, acknowledging the circuit split but concluding 
that it saw no reason to part from Pickering when deciding cases involving a teachers 
in-class speech.138  The court went on to rule (unlike the Kirkland and Boring courts) 
that the teachers speech had indeed been constitutionally protected, concluding that the 
                                                
134 Id. at 371. 
135 Id. at  378 (Motz, J., dissenting).  The dissent also argued that in the alternative, even under the 
Pickering-Connick framework, the teachers claim should still go forward.  Id. at 378.  Somewhat counter-
intuitively (in light of the dissents view that Hazelwood should apply and that the case should go forward), 
the dissent also asserted that Hazelwood is a less speech-protective approach than Pickering.   Id.  Indeed, 
the dissent tried to justify the position that Hazelwood should apply precisely on grounds that the 
Pickering-Connick framework fails to give school administrators the necessary and appropriate control 
over a teachers in-class speech.  Id. 
136 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). 
137 Id. at 1042-45. 
138 Id. at 1055 n. 7. 
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speech had related to a matter of public concern and that the Pickering balancing weighed 
in the teachers favor.139   
 Finally, as noted above, on January 24, 2007  in the first circuit court decision to 
address this issue following Garcettis refinement of the Pickering-Connick framework   
the Seventh Circuit held in Mayer v. Monroe County Community Schools Corporation140 
that Pickering and its progeny applied to teachers classroom speech.  On that basis, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff teachers First Amendment claim that she had been 
terminated for telling her students during a classroom discussion of current events that 
she opposed the war in Iraq, holding that she had been speaking in her capacity as an 
employee and was therefore unprotected.141     
 The Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have not squarely addressed the issue of how 
to evaluate the constitutionality of restrictions on teachers in-class speech, but there are 
some clues as to how the Third and Ninth Circuits are likely to come out.  As noted 
above, the Third Circuit quite emphatically ruled in Bradley and Edwards that 
Hazelwood is inapplicable to curricular decisions (which reflect pure government speech 
and are thus unprotected by the First Amendment), suggesting that the circuit may take a 
similar approach to teachers in-class speech.142  The signals from the Ninth Circuit, 
however, have been more mixed.  On the one hand, in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified 
School District,143 the Ninth Circuit concluded that a teachers posting of anti-gay 
messages on a bulletin board near his classroom was not governed by Hazelwood because 
                                                
139 Id. at 1050-55.  The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed this approach in Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of 
the Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005).   
140 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
141 Id. at 478-480. 
142 This would make Hazelwood inapplicable, and would readily resolve the Pickering inquiry in the 
governments favor (given the lack of any cognizable First Amendment interest by the teacher).   
143 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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the speech at issue was pure government speech.  The Downs court stated that the boards 
were the property of the school district, that [o]nly school faculty and staff had access to 
post materials on these boards, and that it was therefore the school district itself 
speaking through the bulletin boards.  Relying in part on the Third Circuits holdings in 
Bradley and Edwards, the court concluded that the teacher had no First Amendment 
right to speak for the government, and that his First Amendment claim therefore 
failed.144  The following year, however, the Ninth Circuit held that at least as to teachers 
instructional speech in the classroom, it would assume arguendo that Hazelwood 
applied.145  
 Interestingly, in addition to their division over whether Hazelwood or Pickering 
should apply to teachers in-class speech, the circuits are not even settled as to which 
framework provides greater protection for teacher speech in the first place.  The Ninth 
Circuit, in deciding to assume arguendo that Hazelwood should apply to teachers in-
class speech, stated that it was doing so precisely because Hazelwood appear[ed] to be 
more speech protective than Pickering.146  By contrast, the Tenth Circuit  as well as the 
dissenting opinion from the Fourth Circuit in Boring  justified their application of 
Hazelwood on grounds that Hazelwood provided less protection for teacher speech, and 
correspondingly greater discretion for school districts, which they deemed appropriate.147   
                                                
144 Id. at 1017. 
145 California Teachers Association v. State Board of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2001) (We 
need not resolve this controversy . . .. to decide the merits of this appeal.  Instead, we may assume that the 
instructional speech [in question] receives some First Amendment protection.  Specifically, we will assume 
that regulations of such speech are subject to the test articulated in Hazelwood.).   
146 Id. at 1149. 
147 See Miles, 944 F.2d at 777 (Although the Pickering test accounts for the states interest as an employer, 
it does not address the significant interests of the state as educator . . . . The concern addressed in Pickering 
 the right of an employee to participate as other citizens in debate on public matters  is simply less 
forceful when considered in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.) (quoting 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266); Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hazelwood 
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 This further lack of consensus indicates how deeply the circuits have fractured 
over this question.  It also illustrates the complexity of the issue: none of the above courts 
explained in detail why they believed that one approach was more speech-protective than 
the other, and in fact there is some truth to both positions.  Pickering provides much more 
protection when the teacher is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and 
much less protection  essentially none at all  in all other circumstances.  Hazelwood, by 
contrast, provides a limited, but consistent, level of protection by generally prohibiting 
speech restrictions that are not reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical purposes.  
(Of course, the determination of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based restrictions 
 the topic that to which I turn in Part III  bears greatly on how speech-protective 
Hazelwood ends up being.)         
 The academic commentary, too, is divided.  Certain commentators have argued 
that public school teachers in-class speech is entitled to significant constitutional 
protection   particularly given the Supreme Courts broad statements about the 
importance of academic freedom  and have championed a variety of frameworks to 
achieve that goal.  Gregory Clarick and Emily Holmes Davis, for example, argue that 
neither Hazelwood nor Pickering are speech-protective enough, and that a Tinker-like 
standard, under which restrictions on teachers classroom speech are permitted only upon 
a showing that the speech caused an actual or potential disruption, should apply.148  
Karen Daly similarly laments that although the Supreme Court has spoken approvingly 
                                                                                                                                            
should apply because the governmental interest element as set forth in Connick fails to give school 
administrators the necessary and appropriate control over a teachers in-class speech.  School 
administrators should be free to specify curriculum and to curtail classroom speech for any legitimate 
pedagogical reasons.  They should not be required to demonstrate that a restriction on in-class speech is 
necessitated by workplace efficiency or harmony).   
148 Gregory Clarick, supra note 9, at 732; Davis, supra note 9, at 366. 
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in dicta of academic freedom, albeit in the context of McCarthy-era statutes, it has not 
provided any precedent directly on point, and that the lower courts  in turning to either 
Hazelwood or Pickering to fill the void  have provided insufficient protection for 
teachers classroom speech.149  She therefore proposes a mixed procedural-substantive 
test  which she refers to as Hazelwood flipped  that evaluates teachers free speech 
claims on the basis of how much prior notice they received that the speech was 
prohibited.150  In support of this approach, Daly argues that a system that permits 
teachers to act as opposing voices within curriculum parameters established by a 
popularly elected school board minimizes the potential of either actor to distort their 
educational function into brainwashing.151 
Other commentators, however, argue that whatever the appropriate scope of 
academic freedom in higher education, the concept of academic freedom is largely 
inapplicable to the speech of K-12 public school teachers.  Todd DeMitchell, for 
example, directly criticizes Dalys approach on grounds that public school teachers are 
hired to speak for the school board[,] thus furthering the school boards message, which 
is the curriculum.152  Dalys notion of a system that provides some room for teachers to 
act as opposing voices, DeMitchell argues, thus makes little sense, and would serve only 
                                                
149 Daly, supra note 9, at 5-16.   
150 Id. at 51-56.  Specifically, Daly argues that where the teacher received prior notice that her speech was 
prohibited, she should receive no constitutional protection; conversely, where the teacher received prior 
administrative approval for the speech, she should receive complete protection.  Id. at 54.  For the cases 
that fall in the middle, Daly advocates shifting presumptions: if a reasonable teacher should have been on 
notice that the speech was prohibited, then the school district should be permitted to discipline the teacher 
as long as doing so satisfies the Hazelwood test of being reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns; by contrast, if a reasonable educator would have lacked this awareness, then the rebuttable 
presumption is that the teachers speech was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns and 
therefore constitutionally protected.  Id. at 54-55. 
151 Id. at 45. 
152 DeMitchell, supra note 9, at 475. 
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to distance[] the public from their public schools.153  W. Stuart Stuller similarly likens 
the notion of academic freedom for K-12 public school teachers to a fish out of water, 
stating that in comparison to the role of a university professor, who is charged with the 
production of scholarship, a public teachers role is to present course materials and serve 
as a role model for his students.154  Noting that most disputes over such teachers in-class 
speech involve value-based decisions that require a sense of community, Stuller argues 
that these questions are best resolved through the democratic process, i.e., the local 
school board, rather than through First Amendment claims.155  In a jointly authored 
article, Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty likewise argue that [a]lthough a teachers 
First Amendment right allows him to say what he wishes outside the classroom, the 
inmates do not run the asylum.  If a school board or principal decides that a particular 
subject is to be taught in a particular way, individual teachers do not have a constitutional 
right in the classroom to preempt the decisions of their superiors.156  A recent Michigan 
Law Review note similarly argues that teachers in-class speech should generally receive 
no First Amendment protection.157 
C. Speech of Outside Entities 
 There is a smaller body of case law (and scant commentary) as to the speech of 
outside entities  such as recruiters, advertisers, and parents   in school-sponsored 
contexts, but the trend here is clearly toward the application of Hazelwood.  The Ninth 
                                                
153 Id. at 475-79. 
154 Stuller, supra note 9, at 335-36. 
155 Id. 
156 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 9, at 67.  See also id. at 81-82 (Whatever the scope of a teachers First 
Amendment right to speak outside the four walls of the school or to discuss in school matters unrelated to a 
curriculum, a teacher has no constitutional right to teach the topics or substance of his choice. . . .   The 
classroom, then, is not a public forum where a teacher has a private First Amendment right to 
communicate..).   
157 See generally Donehower, supra note 9. 
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and Eleventh Circuits have already moved in this direction, as have several district 
courts.   
 The Eleventh Circuit was the first to apply Hazelwood to the speech of outside 
entities in school-sponsored settings, in the 1989 case of Searcey v. Harris.158  There, the 
Atlanta Peace Alliance sued the Atlanta School Board over its policy of excluding it from 
its Career Day program, while permitting military recruiters to participate.159  The school 
board had excluded the Peace Alliance on the basis of its Career Day policy, which stated 
(among other things) that participants in the program must have direct knowledge of 
the career about which they would speak, must have a present affiliation with that 
career field, and could not criticize or denigrate that career field.160  Without any real 
discussion of whether it mattered that Hazelwood had been a student speech case, the 
Eleventh Circuit deemed Hazelwood applicable.161  It further concluded, as discussed 
infra, that Hazelwood prohibited viewpoint discrimination, such that it would be 
unconstitutional for the board to allow speakers to point out the advantages of a political 
career but ban any speaker from pointing out the disadvantages of the same career.162 
 The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied Hazelwood to the speech of outside 
entities in Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School District,163 in which Planned 
Parenthood sued after a school district refused to accept advertisements that it submitted 
for publication in the districts high school newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic 
programs.164  Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Searcey, the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
                                                
158 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989). 
159 Id. at 1315-17. 
160 Id. at 1317-18. 
161 Id. at 1319. 
162 Id. at 1319 & n. 7, 1324-25.  
163 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991). 
164 Id. at 820. 
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addressed whether it was appropriate to extend Hazelwood outside of the student speech 
context.  It answered that question in the affirmative, stating that the Hazelwood Court 
had specifically spoke[n] in terms of school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities.165  The Ninth Circuit further noted that, at 
the beginning of Hazelwood, the Court had stated that unless the school has opened up its 
facilities to the general public, school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on 
the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.166  It thus 
concluded that there is no principled distinction between students constitutional rights 
and those of Planned Parenthood to access to school-sponsored publications.167  The 
Ninth Circuit went on to hold (as had the Eleventh Circuit in Searcey, and as further 
discussed infra) that Hazelwood prohibited viewpoint discrimination.168  Ultimately, 
however, it ruled in favor of the school district, reasoning that its actions were 
constitutionally permissible because both pro-choice/birth control-related advertisements 
and pro-life advertisements had been excluded by district policy.169  Similarly, in 
DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School District,170 the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood to a 
plaintiffs claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when a school district 
refused to post his advertisement displaying the Ten Commandments on the high school 
baseball field fence.171 
 Recently, a new school fundraising trend has given rise to another type of outside 
entity speech in the school setting.  This trend consists of fund-raisers involving the sale 
                                                
165 Id. at 827. 
166 Id.  For further discussion of this portion of Hazelwood, see infra text accompanying notes 217-221. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 829. 
169 Id.  
170 196 F.3d 958. 
171 Id. at 962-69. 
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of bricks or tiles that are going to be placed on some sort of walkway on or near the 
school, with the idea that purchasers  typically parents  can have a personal message 
inscribed on the brick or tile.  In the past two years, this trend has already given rise to 
three different district court cases along remarkably similar lines: a parent purchases a 
brick or tile, submits a religious message to be inscribed (e.g., [student name,] Jesus 
Loves You); the school district refuses the submission, and the parent files a First 
Amendment claim.172  In all three cases, the district courts turned to Hazelwood for 
guidance, and ultimately held that the school districts restrictions had reflected 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.173   
* * * 
 Two conclusions emerge from an examination of the contexts in which 
Hazelwood has been applied in the nearly twenty years since it was decided.  First, 
Hazelwoods reach now extends far beyond the student speech context.  Second, there is 
a clear lack of consensus among the circuits as to precisely where the boundaries of its 
reach should be drawn.  Not only are different circuits reaching different conclusions 
about how broadly Hazelwood should extend, but (as evidenced in the division over 
teacher speech) they are not even settled as to which rationales point in which directions.  
These developments have significantly complicated the courts analysis of whether 
Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based speech restrictions, the topic to which I now turn. 
 
                                                
172 See Kiesinger v. Mexico Academy, 427 F. Supp. 2d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving brick walkway in 
front of high school); Demmon v. Loudoun Cty. Public Schools, 342 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(involving brick walkway of fame on high school property); Seidman v. Paradise Valley, 327 F. Supp. 2d 
1098 (D. Ariz. 2004) (involving Tiles for Smiles program in which parents purchased 4 x 8 tiles to be 
permanently affixed to interior elementary school walls). 
173 Kiesinger, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 191-195; Demmon, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Seidman, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 
1105-1112. 
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III. The Split Over Whether Hazelwood Permits Viewpoint-Related Restrictions 
While the circuit division over Hazelwoods reach is significant in its own right, 
it takes on added importance when viewed in the context of the circuits division over 
whether Hazelwood allows viewpoint-related restrictions in addition to content-related 
restrictions.  The Hazelwood Court never explicitly addressed this question,174 leaving 
courts (and commentators) to puzzle over this issue.  So far, the Second, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Hazelwood prohibits viewpoint-based restrictions, 
while the First and Tenth Circuits have held that it permits them.175   
 Hazelwood itself provides some evidence for both sides of the debate.  As 
described above, in section II.A of its analysis, the Court invoked general public forum 
principles, stating that  
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other 
traditional public forums . . . .  Hence, school facilities may be deemed to be 
public forums only if school authorities have by policy or practice opened those 
facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the 
public such as student organizations.  If the facilities have been instead been 
reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public 
forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions 
on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.  
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting 
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for 
public discourse.176 
                                                
174 Evidently, the school had conceded that control over access to Spectrum is permissible only if the 
distinctions drawn are viewpoint neutral, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 287 n. 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting), thus 
moving this issue to the periphery of the case.    
175 The Third and Sixth Circuits also briefly weighed in on the issue, but ultimately retracted those opinions 
on other grounds.  In C.H. v. Oliva, discussed in greater depth infra, a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit 
initially concluded that Hazelwood permitted viewpoint-based restrictions.  195 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 
1999).  The Third Circuit subsequently took the case en banc, at which point it vacated the earlier opinion 
and resolved the case on other grounds, such that it did not need to resolve the viewpoint discrimination 
issue.  226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).  Similarly, in Kincaid v. Gibson, a three-judge panel of the Sixth 
Circuit initially interpreted Hazelwood as prohibiting viewpoint-based restrictions.  191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th 
Cir. 1999).  The Sixth Circuit then took the case en banc, vacated the earlier decision, and resolved the case 
on other grounds.  236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001). 
176 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (citing Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 
37, 47 (1983) and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)).   
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The Hazelwood Court went on to conclude that, because the Spectrum was part of the 
educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity subject to considerable 
oversight by the journalism teacher and ultimately the school principal, it constituted a 
nonpublic forum.177  The Court thus concluded, citing its previous seminal decisions in 
Perry and Cornelius (which outlined the legal framework for First Amendment cases 
involving nonpublic fora) that school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of 
Spectrum in any reasonable manner.178   
 What the Hazelwood Court omitted, however, was that Perry and Cornelius had 
not only held that restrictions in nonpublic fora had to be reasonable, but had also stated 
that such restrictions must be viewpoint-neutral.179  In only discussing the need for 
reasonableness, then, the Hazelwood Court left unclear whether the viewpoint neutrality 
requirement still applied to the school districts restrictions on the Spectrum.  While 
Hazelwoods invocation of Perry and Cornelius in section II.A arguably points in the 
direction of maintaining the viewpoint neutrality requirement, subsequent parts of 
Hazelwood  such as its subsequent statement in section II.B that a school must retain 
the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably perceived to 
advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 
the shared values of a civilized social order180  point the other way.   
                                                
177 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 568-70. 
178 Id. at 570. 
179 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter 
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum and are viewpoint neutral.) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49)).   
180 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. 
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The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Hazelwood as 
implicitly maintaining the viewpoint neutrality requirement.  The prohibition against 
viewpoint discrimination is firmly embedded in first amendment analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned in Searcey, the first circuit court decision addressing this issue.181 
Without more explicit direction, we will continue to require school officials to make 
decisions relating to speech that are viewpoint neutral.182  Similarly, in Planned 
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit simply cited Cornelius and Perry in concluding that 
Hazelwood required viewpoint neutrality.183  Most recently, in late 2005, in Peck v. 
Baldwinsville Central School District,184 the Second Circuit likewise relied on Cornelius 
and Perry in holding that Hazelwood did not permit viewpoint-based restrictions, noting 
that Hazelwood had itself made reference to Cornelius and Perry, and stating that we are 
reluctant to conclude that the Supreme Court would, without discussion and indeed 
totally sub silentio, overrule Cornelius and Perry  even in the limited context of school-
sponsored student speech.185   
Commentators asserting that Hazelwood should be read as requiring viewpoint 
neutrality have generally argued along similar lines.  Katie Hammett, for example, argues 
that [g]iven the clear public forum standards developed and the great importance of the 
First Amendment protection of free speech, it seems much more likely that if the majority 
in Hazelwood meant to create a new category in the public forum and not require 
viewpoint-neutrality, as is required in all other categories, the Court would have 
                                                
181 Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1325. 
182 Id.  
183 Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 829. 
184 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005). 
185 Id. at 632-33. 
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explicitly stated that it was doing so.186  Denise Daugherty similarly argues that [i]n the 
absence of clear instruction from the Supreme Court to abandon the viewpoint neutral 
requirement on restrictions of free speech, the circuit courts should not discard the 
requirement on their own.187   
 The First and Tenth Circuits, by contrast, have both concluded that Hazelwood 
permits viewpoint discrimination.  The First Circuit reached that conclusion without 
much analysis in Ward, a teacher speech case, simply stating that while citing Perry, 
[Hazelwood] did not require that school regulation of school-sponsored speech be 
viewpoint neutral.188   
 The Tenth Circuit analyzed the viewpoint discrimination issue in more depth in 
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District,189 a case involving tiles that were painted by 
students and their families in the aftermath of the April 1999 Columbine High School 
massacre.  Columbine had implemented a tile-painting project designed to reintroduce 
students to the school, but had prohibited tiles that included religious symbols, the date 
of the shooting, or anything obscene or offensive, and on that basis refused to hang 
certain tiles (which included, inter alia, crosses, gang graffiti, the date 4-20, a skull 
dripping with blood, and a Jewish star) in school hallways.190  Analyzing the plaintiffs 
claim that the schools refusal to hang their tiles violated their free speech rights, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that Hazelwood did not require viewpoint neutrality, reasoning 
that the Courts specific reasons supporting greater control over school-sponsored 
speech, such as determining the appropriateness of the message, the sensitivity of the 
                                                
186 Hammett, supra note 9, at 405. 
187 Daugherty, supra note 9, at 1083. 
188 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993). 
189 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002). 
190 Id. at 921-22. 
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issue, and with which messages a school chooses to associate itself, often will turn on 
viewpoint-based judgments. . . .  No doubt the school could promote student speech 
advocating against drug use, without being obligated to sponsor speech with the opposing 
viewpoint.191  Janna Annest similarly argues that Hazelwood implies the permissibility 
of viewpoint-based restrictions in school-sponsored contexts, arguing that [i]f the Court 
intended to impose standard nonpublic forum strictures on public schools, the principals 
actions would have been analyzed for evidence of viewpoint-neutrality instead of simply 
for reasonableness.192 
 Thus, as with the circuit split over Hazelwoods reach, here too courts and 
commentators are divided.  But while much attention has been devoted to analyzing each 
of these splits as distinct phenomena, there has been very little examination of whether 
the two splits are related.  In fact, as I argue below, the two splits are connected in an 
important way that helps to shed light on both issues.   
 
IV. The Connective Thread: Linking The Two Splits 
 How does the circuit split over Hazelwoods reach connect to the circuit split over 
whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based restrictions?  My thesis is straightforward: 
when evaluating whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, courts have been 
influenced (perhaps without even realizing it) by the context in which they are applying 
it.   As such, the extension of Hazelwood to contexts beyond school-sponsored student 
speech has directly contributed to the confusion and conflict over whether Hazelwood 
should be interpreted as permitting viewpoint discrimination.   
                                                
191  Id. at 928.   
192 Annest, supra note 9, at 1249. 
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 Indeed, out of the five circuits that have conclusively reached the Hazelwood 
viewpoint discrimination issue, three of them did so in cases that did not even involve 
student speech.  As noted above, the First Circuit first reached the issue in Ward, which 
was a teacher classroom speech case.  The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, meanwhile, both 
reached the issue in outside entity speech cases (respectively, Planned Parenthood and 
Searcey).  It is not surprising, therefore, that the First Circuit readily concluded that 
Hazelwood permitted viewpoint-based restrictions, while the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit 
came down on the other side.  The question of whether school districts can implement 
restrictions as to the viewpoints that a teacher expresses to her students in the classroom 
implicates very different concerns than the question of whether school districts can 
maintain viewpoint-based restrictions once they open school-sponsored settings up to 
speech by outside entities.  In short, once Hazelwood is interpreted as applying to the 
speech of students, teachers, and outside entities, it is not possible to reach a uniform, 
workable answer to the viewpoint discrimination question. 
 The notion that a school district cannot impose viewpoint-based restrictions as to 
what its teachers say to students in the classroom is deeply problematic.  It would 
suggest, for instance, that if the curriculum included a unit on slavery, it would violate 
teachers First Amendment rights to permit them to express anti-slavery views while 
prohibiting them from expressing pro-slavery views.  Teachers sharing anti-democracy 
views with their students in the context of a government class would be similarly 
protected.193  While courts would still likely be able to impose certain constraints on 
                                                
193 Cf. Stuller, supra note 9, at 341 (arguing that the normal operations of schools would be rife with First 
Amendment horror shows if only the First Amendment applied.  Teachers are routinely required to have 
their lesson plans approved in advance: prior restraints.  They are often called upon to teach from a text 
with which they have a measure of disagreement: coerced speech.  And, of course, viewpoint 
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teacher autonomy  for example, the Establishment Clause would limit teachers ability 
to engage in religious speech   a ruling that Hazelwood applies to teachers in-class 
speech and prohibits all viewpoint-based speech restrictions would clearly transfer 
tremendous authority from democratically-elected school boards to individual teachers.  
Indeed, it would largely undermine school boards ability to shape and control what 
students in the district were learning in their classrooms.   
 Once a court concludes that Hazelwood applies to teacher speech, therefore, it is 
naturally propelled toward the conclusion that Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based 
restrictions, as was the First Circuit in Ward.  Conversely, and as discussed in more detail 
below, no circuit holding viewpoint discrimination impermissible under Hazelwood has 
so held in a case involving the application of Hazelwood to teachers classroom speech..   
Relatedly, it is noteworthy that other than the First Circuit, the other circuit having 
explicitly held viewpoint-related restrictions permissible  the Tenth Circuit  is also one 
that, as discussed above, had already been in the forefront of applying Hazelwood to 
teachers classroom speech and even curricular selection.  Had the Tenth Circuit held in 
Fleming that viewpoint discrimination was impermissible under Hazelwood, its 
precedents, taken together, would have suggested that school officials could not regulate 
the viewpoints that teachers communicated to their students in class. 
 By contrast, of the three circuits concluding that viewpoint discrimination is 
impermissible under Hazelwood (the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh), two reached that 
conclusion in cases involving the speech of outside entities.  As noted above, the Ninth 
Circuit decided that Hazelwood forbade viewpoint discrimination when evaluating 
                                                                                                                                            
discrimination is rampant: humans evolved from lower species; the Holocaust did occur; and racial 
stereotyping is bad.).   
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Planned Parenthoods right to advertise in school publications, and the Eleventh Circuit 
reached that conclusion when evaluating peace activists right to participate alongside 
military recruiters in a high school career fair.  Just as it makes sense that the First Circuit 
concluded that Hazelwood permitted viewpoint-based restrictions when it viewed the 
issue through the lens of teacher speech, so too does it follow that the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits held that Hazelwood forbade viewpoint-based restrictions when they were 
introduced to the question in the context of speech by outside entities.  Unlike teachers 
classroom speech  which school districts hire teachers to engage in, and which is at the 
very center of schools educational and inculcative functions   the speech of outside 
entities such as recruiters and advertisers is far more analogous to the speech that 
generally triggers basic public forum analysis, under which viewpoint-based restrictions 
even in nonpublic fora are unconstitutional.   
It is ironic that although Hazelwood was a student speech case, much of the 
courts analysis over whether it allows viewpoint discrimination has arisen in other 
factually distinct contexts.  It is also unfortunate.  Courts that have broadly extended 
Hazelwood to a variety of school-sponsored speech contexts, and are reaching the 
Hazelwood viewpoint discrimination issue in whichever context it arises first, run the risk 
of unnecessarily boxing themselves in for future cases.   
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have already been faced with this predicament.  
The Ninth Circuit confronted it in Downs v. Los Angeles United School District,194 a 
2000 case in which a high school teacher who objected to the schools recognition of 
Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month created his own bulletin board entitled Testing 
                                                
194 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Tolerance.195  This bulletin board featured a portion of the Declaration of Independence, 
excerpts from newspaper articles (including one indicating that 60% of Americans 
considered homosexuality immoral), and a Bible quote condemning homosexuality.196  
His bulletin board thus stood as a direct response to the bulletin boards that his colleagues 
 whose boards depicted rainbow flags, lists of famous gays and lesbians in history, 
articles about domestic partnership benefits, and the like    had created.197  When district 
officials ordered the materials removed, the teacher brought a First Amendment claim, 
and contended on appeal that even if Hazelwood applied to his speech (as the district 
court had held in dismissing his claim), Hazelwood required viewpoint neutrality.198  In 
support of this position, the teacher was able to invoke Planned Parenthood, in which the 
Ninth Circuit had held that Hazelwood was broadly applicable in school-sponsored 
speech contexts and that it forbade viewpoint discrimination.199   
The Downs Court thus found itself painted into a corner: it quite evidently felt that 
the school district should be permitted to restrict this sort of teacher speech, but the 
viewpoint neutrality requirement previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Planned 
Parenthood made it difficult to reach that outcome.  After all, the school was censoring a 
bulletin board expressing negative messages about homosexuality while permitting 
bulletin boards expressing the contrary viewpoint to remain.  The court ended up taking a 
circuitous route to arrive at its desired result.  It held that the teachers speech on the 
bulletin board was not in fact teacher speech at all, but rather pure government speech, 
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because the principal retained authority over all of the school bulletin boards.200  As such, 
the court reasoned, Planned Parenthood and its viewpoint neutrality requirement were 
inapplicable.201   
This solution, while initially appealing, fails to hold up under examination.  The 
actual speech in question was not pure government speech: it did not reflect the views of 
the school district, and indeed was directed at opposing the schools decision to recognize 
Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month.  That the principal retained authority over the 
bulletin board upon which the teacher had posted this dissenting speech did not transform 
that speech into pure school speech any more than the Hazelwood East High School 
principals authority to censor the Spectrum rendered that newspaper pure government 
speech.  Just as the Hazelwood Court deemed the Spectrum school-sponsored speech 
(rather than pure government speech, a possibility that the Hazelwood Court did not even 
consider), so too did the Downs teachers speech fall into that category.  But because that 
conclusion would have forced the Ninth Circuit to apply Planned Parenthood  which it 
made clear that it did not want to do202  it adopted the logically problematic approach of 
deeming the teachers speech to be government speech and distinguishing Planned 
Parenthood on that basis.  The constraints that pushed the Downs court toward that 
approach are evident, but a more intellectually honest solution would have been to 
directly revisit Planned Parenthoods broad holding that Hazelwood was applicable 
                                                
200 Id. at 1011-12. 
201 Id. at 1011. 
202 Id. at 1010-11 (Despite the absence of express viewpoint neutrality discussion anywhere in 
Hazelwood, the Planned Parenthood court incorporated viewpoint neutrality analysis into nonpublic 
forum, school-sponsored speech cases in our Circuit.  Thus, were Downss case a case of school-sponsored 
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beyond school-sponsored student speech and generally prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination.   
The Eleventh Circuit found itself similarly constrained when it had to decide 
Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County.203  There, a high school undergoing a 
long-term remodeling decided to invite its students to paint murals on the large plywood 
panels that appeared throughout the schools exterior and interior hallways.  The only 
instruction given to the students was that their artwork could not be profane or offensive 
to anyone.204  One student proceeded to paint three murals that featured religious 
language (such as God Loves You.  What Part of Thou Shalt Not Didnt You 
Understand?  God.) and symbols (such as crucifixes).205  The murals quickly led to 
commotion and media attention, and the faculty advisor ordered the student to paint over 
the religious portions of her murals.206  The student, in turn, brought a First Amendment 
claim, arguing that this amounted to viewpoint discrimination, which the Eleventh Circuit 
had already held in Searcey (again, a case involving outside entity speech) was 
impermissible under Hazelwood.207   
A recent string of Supreme Court cases, culminating in Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School,208 supported the students argument that the exclusion of her 
religiously-themed murals constituted viewpoint discrimination.209  The Bannon majority 
                                                
203 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004). 
204 Id. at 1210. 
205 Id. at 1211. 
206 Id.  
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209 In Good News, a school district had established a community use policy whereby the school building 
could be used after hours by district residents for instruction in any branch of education, learning or the 
arts, and could also be used for social,, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and 
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community.  Id. at 102.  The policy prohibited, however, the use 
of the building for religious purposes.  Id. at 103.  On that basis, the district refused to allow the Good 
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opinion, however, did not even mention Good News.  Instead, referring only to the 
Supreme Court cases that had preceded Good News (which were less directly on point), it 
held rather summarily that the school did not engage in viewpoint discrimination, but 
rather censored the murals on the basis of their content . . . .   [t]hese are obviously 
inherently religious messages, which cannot be recast as the discussion of secular topics 
from a religious perspective.210  Having essentially assumed away the viewpoint 
discrimination issue, the majority then easily held that the restriction satisfied Hazelwood 
because it was reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical concern of reducing the 
disruption caused by the murals.211  
The Bannon concurrence, by contrast, acknowledged that under the relevant 
Supreme Court precedents, the school districts actions reflected viewpoint 
discrimination, which the Eleventh Circuits Searcey decision had previously interpreted 
Hazelwood as prohibiting.212  The concurrence concluded, however, that Searcey could 
be distinguished because Searcey had involved outside entity speech, while this case 
involved student speech.213  Searcey merely stands for the proposition that when a 
school has opened itself to outside speakers for some school-sponsored function, such as 
career day, it may not discriminate against the outside speakers viewpoints, the 
                                                                                                                                            
News Club  whose activities included prayer and proselytization  to use the school building after hours.  
The Supreme Court held that this amounted to viewpoint discrimination, on grounds that the Club merely 
sought to address a subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the teaching of morals and character, from 
a religious standpoint.   Id. at 109-110.  It further held that viewpoint discrimination was impermissible in 
a limited public forum (which both sides agreed had been created by the districts actions), and that the 
districts actions were therefore unconstitutional.  Id. at 111-12.   Because the situation in Good News 
involved a limited public forum rather than a nonpublic forum, Hazelwood was inapplicable. 
210 Id. at 1216. 
211 Id. at 1217. 
212 Id. at 1217 (Black, J., concurring). 
213 Id. at 1218-19. 
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concurrence argued.214  By contrast, the concurrence continued, Hazelwood could still be 
read as permitting viewpoint-based restrictions against school-sponsored student speech, 
particularly given the portions of Hazelwood regarding student speech that might be 
perceived as advocating drug use, alcohol use, or irresponsible sex.215  The concurrence 
thus agreed that the school districts speech restriction had been permissible, but followed 
a different route in getting there.216  
Downs and Bannon illustrate the problematic intersection between the broad 
extension of Hazelwood and the viewpoint discrimination issue.  School-sponsored 
speech encompasses a broad range, and the interests implicated by teachers classroom 
speech, outside entity speech, and student speech are significantly different.  A one-size-
fits-all approach to all school-sponsored speech, therefore, is destined for failure.  The 
Bannon concurrence does offer one possible solution to the problem: holding that 
Hazelwoods reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns standard applies 
across-the-board to school-sponsored speech, but interpreting this standard as permitting 
viewpoint-based restrictions in some contexts while not in others.   
The better approach, however, is to return to Hazelwoods core as a student 
speech case, and to limit its applicability to that setting.  Of course, courts often apply 
precedents to factually distinct settings  broadening, contracting, and otherwise 
modifying them along the way.  In Hazelwoods case, however, this extension into 
factually distinct contexts has been ill-advised.  A close examination of Hazelwood 
                                                
214 Id. at 1218. 
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216 Neither the majority nor the concurrence addressed the separate question of whether the murals 
presence would have created an Establishment Clause problem.  Having ruled that the restriction on the 
murals did not violate the First Amendment in the first place, they did not need to proceed to that aspect of 
the school districts defense. 
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makes clear that it did not simply arise in a student speech context, but that its entire 
rationale and approach are uniquely suited to student speech.  Furthermore, as discussed 
below, other existing legal frameworks are far more appropriate for the other categories 
of school-sponsored speech to which Hazelwood has been applied, and there is no reason 
to interpret Hazelwood as supplanting those frameworks.    
The notion that Hazelwood should apply to all school-sponsored speech seems to 
stem from the Hazelwood Courts initial broad statement that when school facilities have 
been reserved for specified intended purposes, no public forum has been created, and 
school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, 
and other members of the school community.217  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
relied on this statement in rejecting Planned Parenthoods argument that Hazelwood 
applied only to student speech.218  This, however, reflects a misreading of Hazelwood.  
That initial statement occurred in Section II.A of the opinion, where the Court essentially 
summarized its public forum jurisprudence and reiterated the reasonableness test that 
applies to nonpublic fora.219  The next part of the opinion   Section II.B  reflects the 
Courts attempt to flesh out what reasonableness meant in the particular context of 
school-sponsored student speech, which was the particular issue raised by the facts in 
Hazelwood.220  It was specifically in that latter, student-focused portion that the Court 
articulated the reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical concern standard.221     
                                                
217 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
218 Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 827. 
219 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70. 
220 Id. at 270-73. 
221 Id. at 273.  Karen Daly has reached the same conclusion, noting that the structure of the [Hazelwood] 
opinion argues for limitation of the reasonably related pedagogical concerns standard to student speech.  
Daly, supra note 9, at 12. 
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In addition to the distinct section headings, two other pieces of textual evidence 
indicate that this standard was formulated specifically for the student speech context.  
First, almost every sentence in this portion of the discussion refers explicitly to student 
expression or student speech   including, most importantly, the very sentence setting 
forth the reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical concern standard.222  Second, 
several of the interests that the Hazelwood Court identified as giving rise to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns indicate that the Hazelwood Court largely had student speech in 
mind.  Although some of the interests mentioned by the Court are equally applicable to 
speakers and listeners (such as restricting speech that is biased, prejudiced, vulgar, 
profane, or inappropriate for the students level of maturity), others bespeak a particular 
emphasis on teaching the speaker a lesson.223   
For example, one pedagogical interest cited by the Hazelwood Court was a 
schools need to ensure that participants in school-sponsored activities learn whatever 
lessons the activity is designed to teach, along with its related need to disapprove of 
ungrammatical, poorly written, [or] inadequately researched speech.224  Indeed, the 
Court later found that the Hazelwood East principals censorship had been reasonable 
precisely because he could have concluded that the students writing these articles had 
                                                
222 In the very first sentence of Section II.B, the Court framed the question as whether the First 
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
270.  It went on to state that educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this . . . form of student 
expression, that [a] school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated 
under its auspices . . . and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards, 
that a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics, that a school must also 
retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug 
or alcohol use, and, finally, that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  Id. at 271-73. 
223See Buss, School Newspapers, supra note 9, at 520-21 (noting that the Court in Hazelwood was not very 
clear in delineating whether Spectrum was a curricular device for teaching its readers or its writers). 
224 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72. 
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failed to master relevant portions of the Journalism II curriculum.225   This rationale 
makes sense only in the context of student speech.  As Karen Daly writes, school 
administrators . . . have no stake in ensuring teachers learn whatever lessons the activity 
is . . . designed to teach.226  The same is, of course, true for outside entities.  By the same 
token, school officials have no real interest in improving the research and writing skills of 
teachers or outside entities; here, too, a legitimate pedagogical concern arises only if the 
speaker is a student.   
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court also identified the interest that schools have in 
awakening . . . child[ren] to cultural values and preparing them for professional 
training, and explained that in order to fulfill this role, schools must retain the authority 
to restrict student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate conduct . . .  
inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.227  Here, too, the Court 
appears to have been particularly concerned with teaching student speakers a lesson   
namely, how to conduct themselves appropriately in public settings so that they would be 
prepared for successful and productive adult lives. 
The broad spirit of Hazelwood, in addition to its text, also counsels its limitation 
to the student speech setting.  The Tinker/Hazelwood division of the student speech 
universe  whereby students have quite broad freedom to express their personal views on 
school premises, but are subject to greater oversight when they do so within the context 
of school-sponsored activities   strikes a balance reflecting the unique relationship 
between students and their schools.  On the one hand, school serves as a microcosm of 
society for K-12 students.  School is their primary opportunity to meet and communicate 
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with each other, and it is there that they take on positions of leadership among their peer 
community in formal and informal ways.  Indeed, as Tinker itself noted, among the 
activities to which schools are dedicated is personal intercommunication among the 
students.228  At the same time, school is a crucial societal mechanism for educating and 
inculcating them in cultural values and mores.  The Tinker/Hazelwood regime responds 
to that duality by roughly aligning the degree of school authority over student speech 
with the level of school sponsorship (and thus apparent approval) of that speech.229    
Neither teachers nor outside entities stand in that same relationship toward 
schools, and other legal doctrines provide better frameworks for assessing the 
constitutionality of school restrictions as to their speech.  The relationship between 
schools and teachers is, at bottom, an employer/employee relationship.  As W. Stuart 
Stuller writes, [t]eaching is an occupation effected through speech.230  Teachers speak 
to students in the classroom because that is what they are hired and paid to do, and such 
in-class speech occurs in their role as adult authority figures.  When schools impose 
restrictions as to teachers classroom speech, those restrictions are not there to achieve 
the Hazelwood interests of improving their grammar, instructing them in social norms, or 
preparing them for successful careers.  Rather, such restrictions  regardless of whether 
they are well- or ill-advised in particular cases  reflect a supervisory attempt to control 
how teachers are performing their job of conveying information to students. 
                                                
228 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 
229 As discussed below in a Section V, I believe that this alignment can be beneficially tightened through a 
sliding-scale approach to Hazelwood.  Where the perception of school imprimatur is likely to be at its 
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text accompanying notes 259-305. 
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It follows that the Pickering framework, as further refined by Connick and 
Garcetti, that generally covers public employees provides the best fit for assessing school 
districts restrictions on the classroom speech of public school teachers.  It is already well 
established that this framework applies to teacher speech outside of the classroom.  As 
described above, Pickering itself involved a public school teachers letter to the editor, 
and several other Supreme Court cases have also applied Pickering to the speech of 
public school teachers.  Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,231 for 
example, involved a teachers complaint to the principal about the schools racially 
discriminatory practices,232 and Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle233 involved a 
teachers call to a local radio station.234   
The courts deeming Hazelwood rather than Pickering applicable to teachers in-
class speech have nonetheless concluded (either explicitly or implicitly) that the 
classroom context somehow renders Pickering inapplicable.235  The Fourth Circuits 
initial Boring opinion, for example, stated that the Pickering-Connick public concern 
analysis simply does not provide a very useful tool when analyzing a teachers classroom 
speech [because] the essence of a teachers role in the classroom, and therefore as an 
employee, is to discuss with students issues of public concern.236  Several commentators 
similarly argue that the classroom environment is so unique that Pickering cannot apply 
to teacher speech that occurs within it.  Karen Daly, for instance, writes that the the 
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Pickering line of cases fails to account for the unique job requirements of public school 
teachers, who are expected to engage in semi-public speech on a variety of topics.237  
Gregory Clarick likewise argues that the distinction between speech related to issues of 
public concern and speech internal to an employees workplace does not take into 
account the function and unique atmosphere of teaching.238   
Given that the entire Pickering-Connick framework centers on a threshold 
assessment of the capacity in which the public employee has spoken, however, it is 
difficult to see why it cannot encompass the classroom speech context.  The fact that a 
public school teachers speech has been uttered in the classroom to students   rather than 
to a radio station, newspaper, or principal  may ultimately lead to a different outcome 
under Pickering.  But that should not utterly remove the case from Pickerings domain.  
The Supreme Courts 2006 Garcetti decision confirms this view.  There, a deputy 
district attorney brought a First Amendment claim after being retaliated against for 
writing a memo to his supervisors in which he concluded that an affidavit used to obtain a 
search warrant had contained serious misrepresentations, and that the resulting criminal 
case should therefore be dismissed.239  Garcetti thus required the Court to clarify an 
important question about the public employee framework that had been developed in 
Pickering and Connick.  As described above, the threshold inquiry under that framework 
is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  Here, 
the plaintiff did not dispute that he had prepared the memo pursuant to his employment 
duties as a prosecutor, but argued that his speech nonetheless satisfied the threshold 
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because it related to a matter of public concern (governmental misconduct).240  The 
Supreme Court, however, held that his speech did not meet the threshold, emphasizing 
that the central inquiry under Pickering-Connick was whether the speech had been uttered 
in the plaintiffs capacity as an employee.  The Court wrote:  
We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
 duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
 and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
 discipline. . . .  When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to 
 perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee.  The fact that his duties 
 sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were  
prohibited from evaluating his performance.241              
Garcetti, despite its occurrence outside of the public school context, is instructive.  
The deputy district attorneys memo was essentially a hybrid of employee speech and 
speech on a matter of public concern  the same characteristic of teachers classroom 
speech that some courts and commentators have identified as making Pickering useless.  
But the Garcetti Court did not hesitate to apply the Pickering-Connick framework to the 
deputy district attorneys speech.  Indeed, no part of the opinion  including the dissents 
 even suggested that the hybrid nature of this speech somehow rendered Pickering 
altogether inapplicable.  Their only disagreement related to the cases outcome under 
Pickering.  This calls into question any notion that Pickering is not also capacious 
enough to include teachers classroom speech.  Indeed, as described above, in the first 
post-Garcetti circuit court case involving a teachers classroom speech  Mayer v. 
Monroe County Community School Corporation242   the Seventh Circuit applied 
Pickering (as refined by Garcetti) without even acknowledging its previous invocation of 
Hazelwood. 
                                                
240 Id. at 1959-60. 
241 Id. at 1960. 
242 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 56
Of course, Garcetti also suggests that public school teachers classroom speech 
would likely not get past the threshold for First Amendment protection.  Just like the 
deputy district attorney in Garcetti, when public school teachers speak in the classroom, 
they are acting as government employees, regardless of whether that speech also happens 
to touch on a matter of public concern.  Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Souter flagged this 
very issue.  He noted that the Garcetti majoritys interpretation of Pickering was 
spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, adding 
that I have to hope that todays majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers 
necessarily speak and write pursuant to official duties.243  The majority, in turn, 
explicitly responded that Justice Souter suggests todays decision may have important 
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value.  There is some 
argument that expression related to academic freedom or classroom instruction implicates 
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Courts 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.  We need not, and for that reason do not, 
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner in a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.244   
It is true that the Garcetti majoritys language (unlike Justice Souters dissent) 
referred generally to academic freedom, and did not explicitly limit itself to speech by 
public college and university professors.  It seems unlikely, however, that the majority 
intended to carve out a broader swath than Justice Souter had himself identified as being 
in jeopardy.  Not only was the majority responding directly to Justice Souter, but the 
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concept of academic freedom is far more established at the university level than at the K-
12 public school level, where school boards bear ultimate responsibility for curricular and 
policy decisions.  As the Seventh Circuit concluded in Mayer: 
K-12 public [e]ducation is compulsory, and children must attend public schools 
 unless their parents are willing to incur the cost of private education or the 
 considerable time commitment of home schooling.  Children who attend school 
 because they must ought not be subject to teachers idiosyncratic perspectives.  
 Majority rule about what subjects and viewpoints will be expressed in the 
 classroom has the potential to turn into indoctrination . . .  But if indoctrination is 
 likely, the power should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office, 
 rather than tenured teachers.  At least the boards views can be debated openly, 
 and the people may choose to elect persons committed to neutrality on 
 contentious issues.245 
 
That said, it remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will ultimately apply the 
Pickering-Connick-Garcetti framework to the professorial context, and it is at least 
plausible that the Court will do so in a way that provides some constitutional protection 
for the classroom speech of K-12 public school teachers.  My purpose is not to speculate 
about whether and how this might occur, but simply to emphasize that any First 
Amendment protection for teachers classroom speech should stem from that public 
employment-based framework, rather than from Hazelwood.246  Trying to fit the square 
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peg of teacher classroom speech into the round hole of Hazelwood ends up distorting 
Hazelwood itself, undermining Hazelwoods utility in the student speech context for 
which it was actually designed.  
Hazelwood should similarly be inapplicable to restrictions on the speech of 
outside entities in school-sponsored settings.  As described above, Hazelwoods analysis 
proceeds in two parts: Section II.A summarizes the Courts general public forum 
doctrine, with repeated reference to Perry and Cornelius; and Section II.B fleshes out 
what reasonableness means in the specific context of school-sponsored student speech 
(implying, in the process, the permissibility of certain viewpoint-based restrictions, as 
discussed above and as discussed further below).  When the speaker is an outside entity 
rather than a student, there is no need to proceed to Section II.B, which was formulated 
specifically for student speech.  Rather, general public forum doctrine should be applied. 
The courts that have applied Hazelwood to outside entity speech have, in practice, 
actually ended up doing this.  But rather than doing so by deeming Hazelwood 
inapplicable outside of the student context, as I urge, they have done so by interpreting 
                                                                                                                                            
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972).  See also Buss, Academic Freedom, supra note 9, 
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security to teachers (such as the plaintiff teacher in Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 
1004 (7th Cir. 1990)) who chose to discuss creationism in the classroom. 
 59
Hazelwood in a way that makes it functionally indistinguishable from basic public forum 
analysis.  In Searcey, for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Career Day at 
issue was a nonpublic forum, that speech restrictions as to the speakers must therefore be 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and that certain restrictions passed that test while 
others did not.247  The only role that Hazelwood played in the discussion, therefore, was 
in the courts rejection of the school districts argument that Hazelwood had eliminated 
the viewpoint neutrality requirement.248  Indeed, the Searcey court specifically stated that 
Hazelwood does not alter the test for reasonableness in a nonpublic forum such as a 
school but rather provides the context in which the reasonableness of regulations should 
be considered.249  The Searcey court would thus have reached the identical result had it 
held Hazelwood altogether inapplicable. 
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit ruled the yearbook in 
question a nonpublic forum, interpreted Hazelwood as maintaining the viewpoint 
neutrality requirement, and then assessed the speech restriction to determine whether it 
had been reasonable and viewpoint neutral.250  Again, the result would have been 
identical had the Ninth Circuit simply deemed Hazelwood inapplicable to the speech of 
outside entities.  Indeed, once Hazelwood is interpreted as containing a viewpoint 
neutrality requirement, it becomes identical to the general approach to a nonpublic forum.  
The viewpoint neutrality requirement is the same, and Hazelwoods reasonable relation 
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to a legitimate pedagogical purpose standard simply becomes one way of phrasing the 
general reasonableness requirement for nonpublic fora.251    
General public forum doctrine also provides schools with the flexibility that they 
need to restrict inappropriate outside entity speech in school-sponsored settings.  As an 
initial matter, schools are not required to open their doors to outside entities in the first 
place.  While the presence of students and teachers in schools is a given, the presence of 
outside entities is not.  Once a school decides to open its doors to outside entities  
whether, for example, by making its facilities generally available after school, holding a 
career forum, selling ads in its yearbook, or providing outside entities with access to its 
distribution systems   it can set the terms for that access.  It can create a limited public 
forum, in which all individuals who wish to speak about a topic that falls within the 
forums boundaries are presumptively entitled to access.  Or it can create a nonpublic 
forum in which each speaker must individually obtain permission before participating, in 
which case restrictions as to particular speakers will be permissible as long as they are 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.   Alternatively, if the school is simply bringing in a 
particular outside speaker to serve as its own agent in conveying a particular message to 
students (for example, an outside health educator to speak about the dangers of drug use 
or unsafe sex), then no forum at all has been created, and no other outside entities will be 
able to claim a First Amendment right of access.252 
                                                
251 See Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2002) (similarly observing, en 
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forum case: the restriction must be reasonable in light of its purpose (a legitimate pedagogical concern) and 
must be viewpoint neutral.).   
252 See, e.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that 
[o]nly where the government allows private parties to express their personal views in a nonpublic forum is 
it required to avoid viewpoint discrimination and that if a government entity or its contractual agents are 
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Applying Hazelwood to outside entity speech, and stretching it to mirror general 
public forum doctrine in the process, is therefore both unnecessary and unwise.  It is 
unnecessary because general public forum doctrine can do the job on its own, and 
Hazelwood should not be interpreted as supplanting it outside of the student speech 
context.  And it is unwise because, as Downs and particularly Bannon illustrate, it leads 
to precedents that end up complicating subsequent applications of Hazelwood to student 
speech.   
Finally, as to textbook and curricular selections, the Third, Fifth, and Seventh 
Circuits have persuasively explained, in Edwards, Chiras, and Mayer respectively, why 
these reflect school district-level decisions and thus amount to pure government speech.   
As such, here tooHazelwood is inapplicable.  Hazelwoods reach should therefore be 
narrowed back to the context in which it first arose: school-sponsored student speech.    
                          
V. My Proposal: A Sliding-Scale Approach for Student Speech 
The extension of Hazelwood to a broad range of speech contexts has not only 
unnecessarily complicated the viewpoint discrimination analysis.  It has also rendered it 
increasingly abstract, with courts largely treating it as a simple yes or no question.  
Returning to Hazelwoods core as a student speech case, in turn, helps to sharpen the 
analysis of this issue. 
 It seems relatively clear that Hazelwood contemplated the permissibility of 
viewpoint-based restrictions as to school-sponsored student speech in at least some 
circumstances.  As described above, the Hazelwood Court stated that public schools must 
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retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise 
inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized order,253 and that schools may also 
dissociate themselves from speech that is biased or prejudiced.254  The Court went on 
to argue that if Tinker  as opposed to its newly-announced standard  applied to school 
newspapers, schools would be faced with including in their newspapers all student 
expression that does not threaten material disruption of classwork or violation of rights 
that are protected by law, regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or 
personally insulting that expression otherwise might be.255  And it predicted that in order 
to prevent that from occurring, many schools would go so far as to dissolve their student 
newspapers altogether.256 
These statements strongly point toward the permissibility of viewpoint-based 
restrictions in some circumstances.  After all, if Hazelwood does not allow viewpoint-
based restrictions, it is difficult to see how it achieves the Hazelwood Courts expressed 
goal of providing schools with additional discretion  beyond what they already possess 
under Tinker  to censor, in school-sponsored settings, student speech that expresses, e.g., 
pro-drug, pro-drinking, or racially intemperate views.  Hazelwoods omission of any 
viewpoint neutrality requirement further points in this direction.  Indeed, Susannah 
Barton Tobin  while opposing viewpoint-based restrictions and urging the Court to 
revisit this issue  concedes that evidence indicates that the 1988 [Hazelwood] Court 
might have intended to abandon the viewpoint neutrality requirement for school 
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speech.257  Interestingly, Tobin reports that when she interviewed one of the Hazelwood 
students attorneys about the case, he described himself as somewhat astonished to learn 
that some courts have construed the case as prohibiting, or at least not authorizing, 
censorship based on the speakers views, reflecting that I always thought that it quite 
clearly did sanction viewpoint discrimination.258   
But concluding that Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination as to some 
school-sponsored student speech should only be the start of the analysis.  The more 
challenging issue  and the one that remains relatively unexplored  is when such 
viewpoint-based restrictions should be allowed under Hazelwood.  In other words, given 
the general suspicion of viewpoint-based restrictions, when will a schools viewpoint-
based restriction sufficiently relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns?  This question 
can best be answered through a sliding-scale approach that incorporates the two core 
aspects of Hazelwood: (1) the initial trigger for Hazelwoods applicability, i.e., the 
occurrence of the speech in a school-sponsored activity that students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school; 
and (2) the ultimate standard once Hazelwood applies, i.e., that the speech restriction be 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  As described below, the 
stronger the perception of school imprimatur over the student speech at issue, the more 
latitude the school should receive to restrict it by means of viewpoint-based 
restrictions.259 
                                                
257 Tobin, supra note 9, at 219.   
258 Id. at 228. 
259 Cf. Jordan, supra note 9, at 1573-74 (arguing that the range of pedagogical concerns considered 
legitimate to sustain a restriction should vary depending on whether the restriction is viewpoint-based, 
and that the avoidance of controversy should not qualify as a legitimate pedagogical concern for purposes 
of viewpoint-based restrictions).  My proposal, rather than taking the question of whether a restriction is 
viewpoint-based as its starting point, instead begins earlier: with an assessment of the school-sponsored 
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The trigger for Hazelwoods applicability is a relatively low one.  Hazelwood 
encompasses students speech in the classroom,260 in their written assignments,261 in 
school publications,262 in school assemblies,263 in school productions,264 in artwork that 
temporarily or permanently decorates the school halls, 265 and in any other activity that is 
supervised by faculty members, designed to impart knowledge or skills to student 
participants, and could be perceived by others as bearing the schools imprimatur.  Given 
this relatively wide range, not all Hazelwood-qualifying student speech is going to be 
equally suggestive of school imprimatur.  Generally speaking, the perception of 
imprimatur will be at its highest in two situations: where the student speech is changing 
the permanent physical appearance of the school itself; or where the student speech is 
substantively changing the nature of other students classroom experience.  In such 
instances, the student expression comes relatively close to functioning as the schools 
own speech, particularly in terms of its practical effect.  Here, school officials should 
receive broad latitude to restrict student speech, even if their restrictions are viewpoint-
                                                                                                                                            
context in which the restriction is occurring, in terms of how strong the perception of school imprimatur is 
likely to be.  That initial assessment, in turn, determines the applicable level of scrutiny for viewpoint-
based restrictions.    
260 See, e.g., C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Hazelwood to school restrictions on 
students ability to read Bible story to class, affd in part by an equally divided court and vacated and 
remanded in part, 226 F.3d 198, 202-203 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools, 
799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying Hazelwood to school restrictions on students show-and-tell 
performance), affd, 1993 U.S. App. 20606 (6th Cir. 1993) (summary order). 
261 See, e.g., Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying Hazelwood to school 
restrictions on students choice of paper topic). 
262 See, e.g., Hazelwood; Paye v. Gibraltar Sch. Dist., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16480 (E.D. Mich. 1991) 
(applying Hazelwood to school restrictions on contents of student literary magazine). 
263 See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F..2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Hazelwood to school disciplinary 
action against student for the speech he delivered during a mandatory school assembly). 
264 See, e.g., McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 Supp. 2d. 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (applying Hazelwood 
to school restrictions on high school marching bands choice of songs).   
265 See, e.g., Peck v. Baldwinsville, 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying Hazelwood to student artwork 
that was to be temporarily displayed during environmental assembly); Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 
298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood to tiles that were to be affixed to school walls); 
Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Hazelwood to student-
created mural that were to remain in school hallways for up to four years). 
 65
related.  By contrast, where the speech is clearly attributable to a particular student and is 
altering neither the schools permanent physical appearance nor other students classroom 
experience, the perception that the school affirmatively approves of the student speech  
as opposed to simply permitting its dissemination  is likely to be lower.  This latter 
category will typically include student speech that is delivered at a school assembly, 
printed in a school publication, or submitted in response to a particular class assignment.  
Here, Hazelwoods standard should be applied more stringently, with school speech 
restrictions that involve viewpoint discrimination being subjected to examination more 
akin to intermediate scrutiny than to rational basis review.  
This distinction is nicely illustrated by the Third Circuit case of C.H. v. Oliva,266 
which involved two instances of school-sponsored student speech falling on different 
places along the imprimatur spectrum.  The first instance occurred when the plaintiff 
child was in kindergarten.  His kindergarten teacher, in connection with Thanksgiving, 
asked the students in the class to make posters depicting what they were thankful for.267  
The plaintiff created a poster indicating that he was thankful for Jesus.268  His poster was 
hung in the hallway along with the other posters produced by students in the plaintiffs 
class, but it was subsequently removed and then placed in a less prominent location.269  
The second instance occurred approximately eighteen months later, when, as part of the 
reading instructional program, the plaintiffs first-grade teacher invited students to bring 
in a book from home and read one of their favorite stories to the entire class.270  The 
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plaintiff brought in The Beginners Bible and sought to read a Bible story to his 
classmates.271  The teacher did not allow him to read the story to his classmates because 
of its religious content, and instead had him read it to her in private.272   
The first-grade Bible story incident is a good example of school-sponsored 
student speech that is likely to produce a strong perception of school imprimatur.  The 
classroom is at the center of a schools pedagogical mission, and schools should have 
significant discretion over what is taught there.  This was not a situation where the 
student simply would have been expressing his own views in response to a question or 
class assignment.  Rather, the student, in reading a Bible story to his classmates as part of 
a classroom lesson, would have been changing the very nature of that lesson and 
affecting his fellow students classroom experience.  As the Third Circuit stated in its 
initial opinion on the case: 
[T]he classroom setting involve[s] a religiously heterogeneous and captive 
 audience.  It is not unreasonable to expect that parents of non-Christian children 
 would resent exposure of their six-year-old children to a reading from the Bible.  
 Nor is it unreasonable to expect that some parents of Christian first graders would 
 regard a compelled classroom exposure to material from the Bible as an 
 infringement of their parental right to guide the religious development of their 
 children at this stage.  Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect that any 
 resentment engendered by [the plaintiffs] reading would have a significant 
 adverse impact on the important relationship between the parents, the teacher, and 
 their school.273  
                                                            
Indeed, given that other students would have been compelled to listen to the Bible story, 
it is even possible that had the school permitted the Bible reading to go forward, it would 
have faced claims of an Establishment Clause violation by other parents.   
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But a school should not have to show that speech will cause an Establishment 
Clause violation in order to justify its decision to exclude it from a classroom lesson.  
When it comes to the substance of classroom lessons, which are at the core of a schools 
educational mission, school officials should retain broad discretion to restrict student 
speech for any legitimate pedagogical purpose  including the avoidance of potential 
disruption or discomfort by other students and their parents   even if doing so entails a 
viewpoint-based restriction.  Of course, schools should not have entirely free rein to 
restrict student speech in the classroom setting.  A restriction that is truly unrelated to any 
legitimate pedagogical purpose (for example, a classroom election-day activity in which 
students can only speak in favor of candidates from one party) should be held 
unconstitutional.  Provided that the school can articulate a genuine pedagogical 
justification for its restriction, however, the restriction should pass constitutional scrutiny 
regardless of whether it is viewpoint-related.   
A similar high-imprimatur situation was presented in Walz v. Egg Harbor 
Township Board of Education,274 in which a first-grader sought to pass out candy canes 
bearing religious messages (which explained that the candy cane represented Jesus, who 
came to earth as our Savior) to his fellow students during an in-class seasonal holiday 
party.275  The pedagogical purpose of the party, according to the school, was to teach 
social skills and respect for others in a festive setting.276  The school, having prohibited 
students from bringing in any gifts with commercial, political, or religious messages, did 
not permit the student to distribute the candy canes at the party, although it did allow him 
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to do so at recess and after school.277  The court upheld the constitutionality of the 
schools actions, explaining that [the student] was not attempting exercise a right to 
personal religious observance in response to a class assignment or activity.  His mothers 
stated purpose was to promote a religious message through the channel of a benign 
classroom activity.278  Again, had the student been permitted to engage in the speech in 
question, the very substance of the classroom activity would have changed.  The schools 
determination that it wanted to maintain the secular nature of this activity warranted great 
deference. 
Other cases falling at the high end of the imprimatur spectrum include Fleming v. 
Jefferson County School District279 and Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach 
County,280 in which the speech at issue would have changed the permanent physical 
appearance of the school.  In Fleming, as discussed above,281 the tiles in question were to 
be installed throughout the schools of Columbine High School, becoming a permanent 
part of the schools interior.  Similarly, in Bannon, the religiously-themed murals were to 
remain in the schools exterior and interior hallways throughout the duration of the 
schools long-term remodeling project, which was to last up to four years.282  In both 
cases, therefore, the speech in question was going to transform the appearance of the 
school itself in a relatively permanent fashion, lasting long after the creator of that speech 
was gone.  The Fleming Court itself emphasized this aspect, stating that expressive 
activities that the school allows to be integrated permanently into the school environment 
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and that students pass by during the school day come much closer to reasonably bearing 
the imprimatur of the school.283  The same is essentially true of Bannon.  In these cases, 
therefore, the schools were properly granted broad discretion to restrict the speech at 
issue, even though some of their restrictions were viewpoint-based.  Like classroom 
lessons, the permanent physical appearance of the school is almost inseparable from the 
school itself.  A reasonable observer is likely to perceive speech permanently etched on 
school walls as the schools own, or, at the very least, as strongly indicative of the 
schools own views. 
The kindergarten incident in Oliva, by contrast, provides a good example of 
student speech that, despite occurring in a school-sponsored context, was not strongly 
suggestive of school imprimatur.  The students poster was going to be temporarily hung 
in a school hallway alongside numerous other posters responding to the same 
Thanksgiving assignment.  The poster was clearly attributable to one particular student, 
was presumably going to be removed relatively soon after the Thanksgiving holiday, and 
was not affecting the substance of any classroom lesson or activity.  In fact, then-Judge 
Alito  in dissenting from the Third Circuits en banc dismissal of the plaintiffs claim as 
to his poster  argued that the poster should not even be considered Hazelwood-
qualifying speech, asserting that [t]hings that students express in class or in assignments 
when called upon to express their own views do not bear the imprimatur of the school 
and do not represent the schools own speech and that reasonable students, parents, and 
members of the public would not have perceived [the plaintiffs] poster as bearing the 
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imprimatur of the school or as an expression of the schools own viewpoint.284  This is 
an aggressive interpretation of Hazelwood, which expressly stated that it covered all 
activities that were part of the school curriculum.  But Judge Alitos larger point  that 
speech contained in one students response to a school assignment is unlikely to yield a 
strong perception of school imprimatur  is well-taken.   
A strikingly similar situation arose in Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School 
District,285 in which a kindergartner, in response to an assignment to create a poster 
illustrating ways to help the environment, drew a poster that included depictions of 
children recycling, trees, grass, and a robed, praying figure intended to be Jesus.286  His 
teacher, when hanging all of the students posters for an environmental assembly, folded 
the plaintiff students poster in half so that the portion depicting Jesus was concealed.287  
The Second Circuit held that the students resulting First Amendment claim could go 
forward, ruling (as noted above288) that Hazelwood generally prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination.289  Here, too, the perception of school imprimatur in regard to the 
students poster was low, given that the poster was hung alongside numerous other 
posters for a limited duration and was clearly attributable to one particular student.  It is 
unlikely that any observer, viewing the students poster in the context of the posters 
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created by the entire class, would have believed that the school itself agreed with or had 
communicated the view that Jesus was a way to save the environment. 
Student speech at assemblies or publications will also typically yield a relatively 
weak perception of school imprimatur.  In Poling v. Murphy,290 for instance, the plaintiff 
students campaign speech for student council president   in which he stated: [t]he 
administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you wont notice.  For example, 
why does [the assistant principal] stutter when he is on the intercom?  He doesnt have a 
speech impediment.  If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for me for 
president.291   was one of numerous speeches delivered by various student candidates 
during a school assembly.  There is no question that the assembly, which was overseen 
by a faculty advisor to the student council and which all students were required to 
attend,292 fell within Hazelwoods broad umbrella.  But it is less likely that the student 
body actually perceived school officials as necessarily agreeing with all of the views 
espoused by the different candidates.  Rather, any perception of school imprimatur was 
likely limited to an impression that the school had permitted its students to make these 
speeches as part of the self-government opportunities offered to them, and that school 
officials did not deem the speeches so inappropriate as to warrant exclusion.  Student-
authored editorials and articles in school newspapers, magazines, yearbooks, and other 
publications are similarly unlikely to yield a particularly strong impression of school 
imprimatur.  The very existence of the student authors by-line implies some level of 
distinction between the schools own views and the views of that student.  
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This is not to say that schools should not have considerable power to restrict 
student speech in school-sponsored contexts that fall on the low end of the imprimatur 
spectrum, i.e., student speech that just satisfies the Hazelwood threshold.  Hazelwood, 
itself a school newspaper case, clearly establishes this authority.   It does, however, mean 
that when school restrictions as to such speech are viewpoint-based, those restrictions 
should at least be subject to some real scrutiny, given the general suspicion of viewpoint 
discrimination and the failure of Hazelwood to speak explicitly to this issue.  Indeed, 
although Hazelwood can be seen as generally providing for deferential rational basis 
review,293 this is the sub-category of Hazelwood cases in which review more akin to 
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate.  Rather than being required to show merely a 
reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical concern, a school imposing a 
viewpoint-based restriction as to student speech in a context yielding only a weak 
perception of school imprimatur should have to show that the restriction is substantially 
related to an important pedagogical purpose  that is, that there is an exceedingly 
persuasive justification for the restriction.294   
This sliding-scale approach, whereby the level of scrutiny of viewpoint-based 
restrictions would be inversely related to the level of school imprimatur, would have two 
speech-protective results.  First, in low-imprimatur settings triggering intermediate 
scrutiny, a school would not be able to impose a viewpoint-based restriction without 
connecting it to an important pedagogical concern.  Not all of the pedagogical concerns 
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that Hazelwood identified as legitimate would necessarily rise to this level, particularly 
given that this more stringent standard would only apply to student speech cases at the 
low end of the imprimatur spectrum.  For example, Hazelwood listed, as two of its 
legitimate pedagogical concerns, assur[ing] that . . . . the views of the individual speaker 
are not erroneously attributed to the school and preserving a schools authority to 
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to . . . associate the 
school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.295  But 
once the speech in question has already been found to yield only a weak perception of 
school sponsorship, it is unlikely that this type of concern will be sufficiently important 
to justify a viewpoint-based restriction.  Similarly, if the schools proffered pedagogical 
interest in imposing the viewpoint-based restriction is the avoidance of potential 
disruption, the school should be required to show a significant likelihood that disruption 
will result from dissemination of the students speech in order to establish an important 
pedagogical concern.   
Second, in such low-imprimatur settings, the school would also have to 
demonstrate a substantial  not just a reasonable   relationship between the viewpoint-
based nature of the restriction and the important pedagogical concern.  This differs from 
Hazelwoods suggestion that generally, the particular method by which the school official 
restricts the student speech need not be closely scrutinized.  That message was 
communicated by the Hazelwood Courts apparent lack of concern over the principals 
harsh method of censoring the two articles in question  i.e., pulling two entire pages 
(which also included other articles) out of the newspaper, rather than deleting only the 
two articles in question or giving the student authors the opportunity to make changes.  
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Acknowledging that the principal had not looked into whether these more limited 
alternative options were feasible, the Court simply noted that the principals actions were 
reasonable under the circumstances as he understood them.296  Even assuming 
arguendo that those actions were reasonable for purposes of a rational basis review, it is 
unlikely that they would satisfy intermediate scrutiny, given that the principals 
pedagogical concerns could have been readily satisfied by the alternative means 
described above.  Only where the important pedagogical concern cannot be effectively 
achieved through a viewpoint-neutral approach should the school officials be deemed as 
having proffered an exceedingly persuasive justification for their viewpoint-based 
restriction.  Thus, a viewpoint-based restriction motivated solely by the schools desire to 
avoid being associated with a controversial position would presumably fail not only 
because this is unlikely to be an important pedagogical concern in the first place (given 
the low perception of school imprimatur), but also because other methods  such as 
prominent disclaimers  could achieve the same goal without suppressing the student 
speakers views.  More broadly, before imposing a viewpoint-based restriction on a 
students speech, school officials would need to communicate with the student to 
determine whether there were any non-viewpoint-based approaches through which the 
schools concerns about the student expression could be alleviated. 
The notion of using a sliding-scale approach to assess restrictions on school-
sponsored student speech accords with Supreme Court precedent on both the school and 
speech fronts.  Indeed, in several other contexts involving public school students 
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has already turned to sliding-scale frameworks 
as the best way of balancing students rights against schools educational and safety 
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needs.  With regard to students Fourth Amendment rights in the context of random drug 
testing, for example, the Court held in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton297 that the 
constitutionality of such testing depends upon a fact-specific weighing of the nature and 
the immediacy of the schools interest in conducting the testing against the nature of the 
students privacy interest and the character of the intrusion.298  Similarly, as to students 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights in the context of school discipline, 
the Court indicated in Goss v. Lopez299 that the level of process that is due depends on the 
extent of the discipline imposed, holding that suspensions of ten days or less require 
some type of notice and informal hearing, while longer suspensions and expulsions 
for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal 
procedures.300      
Meanwhile, on the speech front, the Pickering-Connick framework itself involves 
a sliding-scale analysis at the second prong of the analysis.  As described above, once a 
court has concluded that the First Amendment threshold is satisfied  i.e., that the 
plaintiff employee was speaking about a matter of public concern in his capacity as a 
citizen  it then proceeds to a balancing test in which the employers interest in regulating 
the speech is weighed against the employees First Amendment interest in uttering it.  
The Connick Court was explicit about the sliding-scale nature of this approach, stating 
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that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employees speech more substantially 
involved matters of public concern.301  Acknowledging that such particularized 
balancing is difficult, the Court emphasized that the court must reach the most 
appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.302      
Just as the Supreme Court has recognized the appropriateness of sliding-scale 
approaches as to other constitutional issues involving both schools and speech, so too 
does this articles proposed sliding-scale approach provide a helpful way of analyzing the 
difficult questions raised by viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech in school-
sponsored settings.  Indeed, returning to some of the cases discussed above usefully 
illustrates how this articles proposed approach would play out in practice.   
The key points of departure between the actual resolution of these cases and the 
proposed approachs resolution of these cases can be seen in Oliva, Peck, and Poling.  In 
Oliva, the initial three-judge panel of the Third Circuit applied the same level of scrutiny 
to both the kindergarten Thanksgiving poster depicting Jesus and the first-grade Bible 
story incident, and upheld the constitutionality of both restrictions on that basis.303  My 
sliding-scale approach, by contrast, would require viewpoint-based restrictions as to the 
Thanksgiving poster to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, given the low perception of 
imprimatur there.  It is unlikely that they could have passed this test.  None of the 
legitimate pedagogical concerns identified by the Oliva panel with regard to removal 
and relocation of the poster  the sensitivity of the issues raised by student religious 
expression, coupled with the notable immaturity of the students involved and the 
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relatively public display of the posters in the school hallway304  is particularly strong.  
No evidence was cited that the poster interfered with any classroom lessons, caused any 
(let alone significant) disruption in the hallways, or placed the school in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Thus, this articles proposed approach would yield the same result 
as to the Bible story, but a different result as to the Thanksgiving poster.   
With Peck and Poling, meanwhile, my proposed approach would lead to the same 
ultimate result, but on somewhat different grounds.  In Peck, as noted above, the Second 
Circuit took the opportunity to rule that Hazelwood generally prohibited viewpoint-based 
restrictions.  Under this articles approach, by contrast, the concealment of the Jesus 
figure on the students poster would be unconstitutional not because viewpoint-based 
discrimination is always prohibited by Hazelwood, but because the context there was 
insufficiently suggestive of school imprimatur to warrant the speech restriction.   
Finally, as to Poling, the school officials discipline of the student would be 
entirely permissible under my proposed approach.  That is because the discipline, at least 
as the school officials explained it, stemmed not from opposition to the views expressed 
by the student, but rather from the conclusion that the students mockery of the assistant 
principals stuttering had been rude and in poor taste.305  Given that the speech restriction 
at issue was not viewpoint-based, my proposed approach would require it only to be 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  By contrast, had the student 
simply criticized the administrations iron grip on the school without using personally 
derogatory language, and had the school still punished him, then such discipline would 
clearly have been based on the substance of the students anti-administration viewpoint.  
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Under my proposed approach, such a viewpoint-based restriction would be subject to 
heightened scrutiny (due to the low-imprimatur setting), and would not likely pass 
constitutional muster, given the lack of any apparent important pedagogical purpose.  
                                                        
VI. Conclusion          
In arguing that Hazelwoods reach has been significantly over-extended, I 
asserted above that a one-size-fits-all approach to Hazelwood is destined for failure.  
Hazelwood was designed specifically to evaluate restrictions on school-sponsored student 
speech, and courts should limit its application to that context, applying general public 
forum doctrine to outside entities speech in school-sponsored settings and Pickering to 
teachers classroom speech.  The confusion and dissension over whether Hazelwood 
permits viewpoint-based restrictions has been an unfortunate byproduct of its over-
extension.   
But even within Hazelwoods core of student speech, a one-size-fits-all approach 
to the viewpoint discrimination issue is not the best method.  Hazelwood itself arose from 
the Supreme Courts recognition that context matters.  Just as the existence of school-
sponsorship determines whether Tinker or Hazelwood applies in the first place, so too 
should the level of school sponsorship guide courts in determining exactly how 
Hazelwood should apply to each particular case.  A more nuanced alignment between the 
perception of school imprimatur and the level of judicial scrutiny applied to viewpoint-
based restrictions, through the sliding-scale approach that I have proposed, will help 
fulfill the underlying rationale of the Tinker/Hazelwood regime and restore balance to 
school officials treatment of student speech. 
